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Abstract 
 
Tax evasion is a crime that harms the national economies, society and indirectly affects all 
the residents of each state. Now that after a long time of international efforts the traditional 
tax evasion tools have eventually been put under a reasonable control, a new technology has 
emerged able to facilitate efficient tax evasion.  
The main objectives of this research are to identify the regulatory challenges of the non-
precedent technology, to analyse the applicability of the current EU legislation aimed at tax 
evasion prevention to the exploitation of cryptocurrencies, and to assess the recommendations 
of academics and international organizations for a possible future regulation. 
This research resulted establishing that tax evasion through cryptocurrencies is easy to 
perform at efficient level for the consumers while difficult to discover for the authorities. Due 
to the novel way of operation of the distributed ledger technology on which cryptocurrencies 
are based, cryptocurrencies cannot be placed under the existing regulation, instead an 
innovative approach is required. Each of the analysed proposition for the future regulation 
can only partly solve some of the challenges presented by the cryptocurrencies as a tool for 
tax evasion therefore a complex and globally consented approach needs to be developed.  
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Summary 
 
Tax evasion is a serious problem which negatively affects national economies, society and in 
an indirect manner all the residents of each state. Previously the main tools for tax evasion 
were corporate structures and bank accounts in tax neutral jurisdictions which due to high 
costs and legal complexity were a privilege of wealthy persons. This privilege was recently 
severally restricted by efficient global counter tax evasion regulations. Nevertheless, a new 
technology was developed – containing characteristics that make it suitable for tax evasion. 
Pseudo anonymity and reduced traceability of cryptocurrency transactions decrease the risk 
of detectability of the tax evasion while the low cost of cryptocurrency transactions grant 
high return thereof.  
As a new disruptive technology, cryptocurrencies face multiple regulatory challenges. They 
operate in the Cyberspace which has no geographical limitations therefore the fragmented 
national regulation cannot restrict the use of cryptocurrencies for tax evasion. The regulators 
need to develop the regulation in a way that would not result in overregulation and prevent 
the development of technological innovation.  
 The current tax evasion prevention regulation is designed to regulate the financial services 
intermediaries and is based on information sharing between the tax authorities or from the 
financial services providers to tax agencies. As cryptocurrencies operate in a decentralized 
manner without a central intermediary, the current legislation cannot be efficiently applied on 
cryptocurrency transactions. In the cryptocurrency environment, no one holds the information 
about the cryptocurrency users and their performed transactions hence no one can share this 
information and tax authorities has no on from whom to request it. 
The main tax evasion prevention documents in the EU, namely the EU Directive on 
administrative cooperation in the field of taxation does not expressly include cryptocurrency 
service providers in its scope therefore it depends on the national legislation of the Member 
states whether the cryptocurrency assets are reported for the taxation purposes or not. The 
only tax evasion prevention regulation that expressly includes cryptocurrency exchanges and 
wallet service providers is EU Anti Money Laundering Directive. Nevertheless, the 
application of this directive is inefficient to fight tax evasion through cryptocurrencies for the 
reason that the Directive is aimed at preventing big crimes and states the minimum limit for 
the tax crimes to be included in its scope. Accordingly, only the tax evasion of considerable 
amount is covered by this directive while the cheap and pseudo-anonymous transactions 
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permit taxes to be evaded even at small amounts. Consequently, an innovative regulation is 
required to efficiently tackle the tax evasion through cryptocurrencies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Tax evasion is a serious crime. It not only harms the national economies but also the society 
and the political system.
1
 Everyone may be affected by the tax crimes directly and indirectly. 
As the Governments collect less revenue, the sectors of public investment such as health, 
education, public security and others receive scarcer funding and may become under-financed 
thus decelerating the economic development.
2
 Consequently, the honest tax payers are 
compelled to bear greater share of the tax burden
3
. Such condition challenges the tax fairness. 
Inequality in taxation renders honest businesses less competitive in the market distorting fair 
competition.
4
 At the same time, more government spending is allotted to ensuring tax 
compliance
5
 which honest taxpayers are forced to cover. Tax evasion often accompanies 
money laundering and corruption hence posing threat to the state sovereignty, authority of the 
state power and democratic values.
 6
 
Tax evasion is a serious problem for the governments. Although the calculation of exact 
amount of taxes evaded is difficult due to the intentional hiding of information, the researches 
estimate USD 189 billion to USD 163 billion of global tax revenue loss in the years 2010 and 
2016 respectively.
7
 While the failure to report and pay taxes on locally held assets is 
occasionally practiced, most of the unreported income is held abroad.
8
 According to various 
reports, substantial amount thereof is held in the countries with preferential tax regimes, the 
so-called tax havens.
9
 Hence, the traditional tax evasion tools include elaborate corporate 
schemes without economic substance, aggressive pricing of assets, intergroup transactions for 
                                                 
1
 Rifat Azam "Ruling the World: Generating International Tax Norms in the Era of Globalization and BEPS," 
Suffolk University Law Review 50, no. 4 (2017): p.519. 
2
 OECD “Action Plan on Base Erosions and Profit Shifting”, OECD Publishing (2013), available on: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en, accessed 10.04.2020, p.8. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 Sinisa Franjic, "Money Laundering Phenomenology," Economic and Social Development, International 
Scientific Conference on Economic and Social Development: The Legal Challenges of Modern World 31 
(2018), p.421. 
7
 Charles Vellutini et al “Estimating International Tax Evasion by Individuals – Final Report”.  Publications 
Office of the European Union (2019): p.27, avaliable on:  
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/2019-taxation-papers-76.pdf. Accessed March 2, 2020.  
8
 Elisa Casi, Christoph Spengel and Barbara M.B. Stage “Cross-Border Tax Evasion after the Common 
Reporting Standard: Game Over?”, ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 18-
036, (July 20, 2019): p.6. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3245144. Accessed 22.04.2020. 
9
 Vellutini, supra note 7. 
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base erosion and profit shifting, and bank accounts in tax havens with strong bank secrecy 
laws, no exchange controls and lack of international treaties.
10
  
The Governments have been trying to combat the tax evasion throughout the history, 
however, only in the last decade they have succeeded to put the traditional tax evasion tools 
under a reasonable control. Only with the realization that the most efficient way to fight the 
tax evasion is information sharing
11
 considerable level of success was achieved. Several 
important documents have been issued shaping the international tax transparency. One of the 
first such documents was the OECD landmark Report on Harmful Tax Competition in 
1998.
12
 The implementation of the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters,
13
 Common Reporting Standard
14
 and Automatic Exchange of Information have also 
had the desired effect.
15
  
Nevertheless, in the meantime a new technology has emerged, perfectly suited for the tax 
evasion. The distributed ledger technology, on which cryptocurrencies are based, endows the 
cryptocurrencies with characteristics that substantially facilitate tax evasion and the 
subsequent asset hiding. Cryptocurrency transfers are quick, global, economic, almost 
anonymous and are out of the reach of the authorities.
16
 As a non-precedent disruptive 
technology, cryptocurrencies face multiple regulatory challenges. The novel decentralized 
way of operation thwarts the application of the existing financial services legislation as well 
as the current tax-evasion prevention legislation on cryptocurrencies requiring innovative 
ways of regulation.  
So far cryptocurrencies have frequently been analysed in the academic legal literature from 
the perspective of their possible use for criminal purposes, money laundering and terrorism 
financing. Although this topic generally includes tax evasion as a type of crime, there are 
specific aspects to the tax evasion that differ from other crimes involving cryptocurrencies. 
Spotting and discovering tax evasion crimes differs from money laundering and terrorism 
                                                 
10
 Graeme S. Cooper, "Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion," Tax Law Review 50, no. 1 (Fall 1994): p.42. 
11
 Vellutini, supra note 7, p.37. 
12
 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition. An Emerging Global Issue (1998). Available on: https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/harmful-tax-competition_9789264162945-en, accessed May 10,2020. 
13
 Azam, supra note 1, p.546. 
14
 Casi, supra note 8. 
15
 Azam, supra note 1, p.543. 
16
 EBA, Opinion on ‘virtual currencies’, 4 July 2014, p.19, available on:  
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf, 
accessed: February 5, 2020. 
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financing due to the possible lack of illicit origin and destination of the funds and the 
transactions may not become illegal until the reporting due date for the respective taxable 
period. Hence, tackling tax evasion requires a different approach and should be examined in 
more detail separately from other criminal activities. 
The use of cryptocurrencies for tax evasion has been brought to attention by several academic 
writers, such as Piergiorgio Valente
17
, Sarah Gruber
18
, Omri Marian
19
, and international 
organizations like European Banking Authority
20
, International Monetary Fund,
21
 Financial 
Action Task Force
22
, however, lacking extensive analysis. Most of such articles are written 
by American authors specifically from the American legal perspective.  
The aim of this research is to analyse deeper the specific aspects exploitation of 
cryptocurrencies for the purpose of tax evasion in the context of the EU legislation. 
For the purposes of this research the term ‘cryptocurrencies’ covers only the pure 
cryptocurrencies that operate on distributed ledger technology using cryptography. All other 
virtual currencies that are not cryptocurrencies due to a different way of operation or different 
underlying technology, as well as any other virtual assets such as tokens or cryptocurrency 
derivatives are excluded from the scope of this work. 
The use of the cryptocurrencies will be analysed solely in the context of tax evasion and only 
the regulation targeted at its prevention will be assessed. Cryptocurrency taxation itself is 
excluded from the scope of this work as taxation is not fully harmonized in the EU and each 
member state applies its own tax regulations at national level. Moreover, currently the 
income from the sale or change in value of cryptocurrencies in different EU Member States is 
taxed under different tax regimes. For this reason, the thesis only deals with the avoidance to 
report and/or pay any taxes allegedly due to any Member State.  
                                                 
17
 Piergiorgio Valente, “Bitcoin and Virtual Currencies Are Real: Are Regulators Still Virtual?”, INTERTAX, 
Volume 46, Issue 6&7 (2018): pp.541-549. 
18
 S. Gruber, "Trust, Identity and Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the Next Virtual Havens for Money 
Laundering and Tax Evasion," Quinnipiac Law Review (QLR) 32, no. 1 (2013), pp.135-[ii]. 
19
 Omri Marian, “Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?”, 112 Mich.L. Rev.FirstImpressions 38 (2013), 
pp.38-48. Available on: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol112/iss1/2, accessed February 12, 2020. 
20
 EBA, supra note 16, p.19. 
21
 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff Discussion Note, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial 
Considerations (2016): p.9. Available on: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf  
Accessed: 05.02.2020. 
22
 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Virtual Currencies, Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks, June 
2014, pp.1-15. Available on: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-
definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf, accessed: March 2, 2020. 
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Cryptocurrency regulation for any other purposes, such as financial services, investor or 
consumer protection, is not considered under this research. However, as tax evasion is often 
viewed together with money laundering, both to some extent being regulated by the same 
legal acts, where these activities are inseparable, they will be regarded jointly.  
Although reduction of taxes payable can take many forms at varying degrees of legitimacy
23
 
and there are certain boundaries between ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax avoidance’24, for the purposes 
of this thesis, any willful intent to artificially reduce or eliminate the tax liability will be 
considered under the term ‘tax evasion’ regardless of whether it formally constitutes a 
criminal offence or not. 
The focus of the thesis is on cryptocurrency regulation in the European Union and only the 
EU legislation will be analysed. Nevertheless, the practices of cryptocurrency regulation in 
other countries or internationally may be referred to for two reasons: 1) in order to compare 
with the practices in the EU; 2) for the reason that cryptocurrencies operate in the cyberspace 
which is not geographically limited, and their global reach is one of the aspects under the 
analysis herein.  
In order to properly research the stated topic, the following questions were analysed: 
1. Which aspects of cryptocurrencies cause the risk of them being used as a tool for tax 
evasion? 
2. What are the main challenges for creating an effective regulation for 
cryptocurrencies? 
3. Does the current regulation of cryptocurrencies in the EU effectively deal with their 
exploitation for tax evasion purposes?  
4. How could the current regulation be improved? 
The thesis consists of three parts. The first part provides the assessment of the current 
situation. It explains the cryptocurrencies from different aspects giving a short historical 
insight in their creation, explains the ideological concept behind them and shortly describes 
the underlying distributed ledger technology so as to provide the basis for the further legal 
                                                 
23
 Cooper, supra note 10, p.45. 
24
 Craig Elliffe “The Thickness of a Prison Wall - When does tax avoidance become a criminal offence?”, 
Taxation Today, Thomson Reuters 30, April 2012, pp.443, 444. 
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implications thereof. It also identifies and explains the characteristics of cryptocurrencies 
caused by the new technology which render them convenient for the purpose of tax evasion. 
The second part deals with the cryptocurrency regulation. In the first subchapter thereof, the 
author explores the new regulatory challenges created by the cryptocurrencies and their 
underpinning technology. In the second subchapter the legal acts currently in force in the EU 
in respect of tax evasion prevention are analysed. Each legal act is particularly assessed in the 
context of its applicability to the users or providers of cryptocurrency transactions and 
whether the regulation is sufficient to prevent tax evasion through the exploitation of 
cryptocurrencies.  
In the third part of the thesis possible recommendations for the future regulation are assessed. 
The author has selected the most relevant proposals of authorities, organizations and 
academic experts and evaluated them assessing their potential implications.  
The following methods have been utilized to respond the research questions: 
1. The descriptive method was used to introduce the cryptocurrencies and to explain their 
operation from the technology point of view.  
2. The qualitative method was used to analyse the characteristics of cryptocurrencies that 
make them suitable for tax evasion. These characteristics were assessed taking into account 
the motives and typical reasons for which the individuals engage in tax evasion activities.   
3. The analytical method was used when analysing the currently existing tax prevention 
legislation of the EU and assessing its applicability to the cryptocurrency transactions. This 
method was also used when doing a critical evaluation of the proposals from scholars and 
international organizations for the future regulation. The possible implications and 
consequences of the proposed regulatory solutions were assessed as well as their potential 
success in solving any one or more problems caused by the new technology.  
The research is based on the existing legislation, working documents on the existing or 
proposed legislation as well as academic sources. All the used information materials may be 
divided into three groups.  The first group comprises the sources that deal with the tackling of 
tax evasion in general and includes both – legal and academic sources. The legal sources 
include the respective directives in force in the EU such as the Directive on administrative 
cooperation in the field of taxation and Anti-Money Laundering Directive. The sources of the 
second group explain the cryptocurrencies. Some of the sources describe the technological 
details thereof such as the explanatory article of the Bitcoin creator Satoshi Nakomoto 
13 
 
published upon launching the first cryptocurrency in the history.
25
 Other sources look at the 
cryptocurrencies from the legal and regulatory perspective such as reports, opinions and 
research papers issued by authorities and international organizations such as European 
Banking Authority,
26
 International Monetary Fund
27
 and Financial Action Task Force.
28
 The 
third group connects the previous two and examines the aspects of the exploitation of 
cryptocurrencies that are relevant for the purpose of tax evasion. This group includes 
primarily academic sources by distinguished tax experts and legal specialists such as 
Piergiorgio Valente
29
, Omri Marian
30
 and Robby Houben
31
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Satoshi Nakamoto “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” (2008). Available on:  
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. Accessed February 19, 2020. 
26
 European Banking Authority, supra note 7. 
27
 International Monetary Fund, supra note 12. 
28
 FATF, supra note 22. 
29
 Valente, supra note 17. 
30
 Marian, supra note 19. 
31
 Robbie Houben and Alexander Snyers, “Cryptocurrencies and blockchain. Legal context and implications for 
financial crime, money laundering and tax evasion”, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of 
Life Policies (2018): pp.1-100. Available on:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20on%20cryptocurrencies%20and%20block
chain.pdf. Accessed: November 11, 2019. 
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1. SITUATION ASSESSMENT 
1.1. Cryptocurrencies explained  
 
1.1.1 Definition 
Cryptocurrencies are a type of virtual currencies defined by the Article 3.18 of the EU Anti 
Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) as: 
“a digital representation of value that is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public 
authority, is not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does not possess a 
legal status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of 
exchange and which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically.”
 32 
According to the definition, the main properties of virtual currencies are independence of 
public authorities, electronic nature and acceptance for exchange. The following 
characteristics distinguish cryptocurrencies from other virtual currencies: 
 decentralization – lack of central administrator or intermediary; 
 use for “peer-to-peer” exchange33; 
 convertibility from and back to fiat currencies34; 
 protection by cryptography.35 
Some of the above listed characteristics may be debated by some experts on general basis, for 
instance the distinguished economist Nouriel Roubini declares that the cryptocurrencies are 
                                                 
32
 Article 3.18, Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 
amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of 
money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, OJ L 156, 
19.6.20, pp. 43–74. Available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018L0843 Accessed February 3, 2020.   
33
 Houben and Snyers, supra note 31, p.23.  
34
 FATF, supra note 22, p.5. 
35
 Ibid. 
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actually not decentralized on the contrary of what is generally believed.
36
 Some of the 
characteristics may not be true for all the cryptocurrencies in the market due to the 
technological advancement in the field and the great diversity of their business models and 
methods of operation.
37
 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research these characteristics 
will be considered applicable as they do technically appertain to the most widely used 
cryptocurrencies with the greatest market capitalization, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin 
or Monero. Such cryptocurrencies are more likely to be used for tax evasion purpose than 
private cryptocurrencies with small market share which may be created for specific purposes.  
Most virtual currencies that are not cryptocurrencies either operate in closed environments 
(platforms or games such as Amazon Cash, Warcraft Gold or Second Life Linden Dollars), 
are centralized (administered by an administrator), or do not have a bi-directional link with 
the real economy (cannot be used to for purchasing goods outside the particular system or 
exchanged for fiat currencies)
 38
. For example, for the purposes of the AMLD, virtual 
currencies that operate exclusively within a particular game environment are exclude from 
the scope of the Directive.
39
 However, this research will exclude all virtual currencies that are 
not cryptocurrencies as such payment instruments are not convenient for tax evasion due to 
higher traceability and lower ability to be used outside the restricted online environment, 
hence less likely to be used for tax evasion purpose. 
 
1.1.2. Origins 
The core concepts and the main drivers for the creation of cryptocurrencies are privacy 
protection and denial of trust in the financial services providers. While use of cash is nearly 
anonymous, considering that tracking the serial numbers of bills is not generally practiced, 
users of banks and credit cards, on the contrary, are fully exposed.
40
 Moreover, the customers 
                                                 
36
 Nouriel Roubini “Blockchain isn't about democracy and decentralisation – it's about greed”, The Guardian, 15 
October 2018, available on https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/15/blockchain-democracy-
decentralisation-bitcoin-price-cryptocurrencies, accessed March 13, 2020. 
37
 FATF, supra note 22, p.3.  
38
 Ibid, pp. 4,5. 
39
 Section (10) of Recitals, Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 
2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of 
money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, OJ L 156, 
19.6.20, p. 43–74. Available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018L0843 
Accessed February 3, 2020.   
40
 David Chaum, Amos Fiat and Moni Naor, “Untraceable Electronic Cash”, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 
1990, p.319, available on: https://www.chaum.com/publications/Untraceable_Electronic_Cash.pdf, accessed 
March 21, 2020. 
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place significant trust in the financial institutions since the latter actually hold the money and 
execute the transactions on behalf of the customers. Cryptocurrencies and the underlying 
digital ledger technology were initially particularly appraised by the cypherpunks and cyber-
libertarians whose ideology promoted destruction of the evil concentration of power 
represented by governments, banks, financial institutions and fiat currencies.
41
 Currently 
however the use of cryptocurrencies has grown from an ideological movement to an ordinary 
widely used means of payment and/or investment. 
Intents to create unconditionally anonymous electronic payment systems have been present 
since 1980’s, for example, the ecash created by the computer scientist David Chaum which 
unlike current cryptocurrencies still depended on a central authority to operate the system but 
anonymized the transaction details.
42
 The first system where the central authority was entirely 
replaced by cryptographic protocols was described in 1998 by the cryptographer Wei Dai,
43
 
and the first fully successful implementation of such cryptography based anonymous peer-to-
peer payment system, was Bitcoin in 2009.
44
 Its popularity grew steadily until 2017 when its 
price skyrocketed by 1200%
45
 creating a financial bubble.
46
 Currently there are more than 
5200 different cryptocurrencies on the market
47
 among which Bitcoin still retains the market 
share above 60 %.
48
 
 
1.1.3. Operational mechanism 
Cryptocurrencies operate on blockchain which is a type of distributed ledger technology. By 
virtue of this technology, there is no need for a central authority to manage the operation of 
the system and verify the transactions as it is done in a distributed way by all the network 
                                                 
41
 Barrett, Jonathan. “A Concession Approach to Distributed Ledger Enterprises”. 25 NZBLQ 30 (2019): pp.30-
44, p.7. 
42
 Chaum, Fiat and Naor, supra note 40. 
43
 Wei Dai “b-money”, available on: http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt, accessed March 21, 2020.  
44
 Bitcoin.org. Frequently asked questions. Available on: https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#general. Accessed March 12, 
2020.  
45
 Charles Bovaird, “Why the crypto market has appreciated more than 1,200% this year”, Forbes, November 
2017. Available on: https://www.forbes.com/sites/cbovaird/2017/11/17/why-the-crypto-market-has-appreciated-
more-than-1200-this-year/#1e3a30556eed. Accessed March 13, 2020.  
46
 Noah Smith “Yep, Bitcoin Was a Bubble. And It Popped.”, Bloomberg, December 11, 2018, available on: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-12-11/yep-bitcoin-was-a-bubble-and-it-popped, accessed 
March 13, 2020. 
47
 All Cryptocurrencies, data: https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/, accessed March 20, 2020. 
48
 Percentage of total market capitalization, data: https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/#dominance-percentage,  
accessed March 20, 2020 
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participants collectively.
49
 Blockchains can be permissioned where the nodes (participants 
permitted to amend the ledger and approve transactions) are selected or approved by an 
administrator, who generally sets the rules for the system but does not control the transactions 
within it, or permissionless where anyone can operate a node only by downloading the 
respective software.
50
  
The transactions are performed by use of two keys that every user has – a public and a private 
key. The remitter of the funds digitally signs the transaction with his/her own private key and 
adds the public key of the receiver.
51
 As the public keys in the form of address can be seen by 
anyone, the history of transactions is public.
52
 At the same time they are anonymous as the 
public keys do not contain any identifying information and the users can generate a new key 
pair for any new transaction.
 53
  
Once requested, each new transaction is communicated to all the nodes of the system. The 
nodes validate the transactions and record them on a block.
54
 By validating the transactions, 
the nodes try to solve a cryptographic puzzle upon which a new block is generated (mining 
process). The miner who first resolves the puzzle is rewarded for the work with newly 
generated coins.
55
 The reward provides incentive for the nodes to participate in the network 
maintenance and verification of the transactions.
56
 At the same time it ensures constant pre-
set money supply which is controlled by an algorithm instead of an authority.
57
  
Once generated, each block of transactions is announced across the network. The block is 
timestamped confirming that all the transactions contained therein are valid and had been 
existing before.
 58
 The timestamp hash of each new block contains the previous timestamps 
thus enforcing all the chain.
59
 By the “consensus mechanism”, the nodes confirm the new 
block and add it to the ledger ensuring immutable chronological order.
 60
 Making changes in 
the transactions, although in theory possible, would be impractical as it would require 
                                                 
49
 World Bank Group, “Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and blockchain, FinTech note, no. 1”, 2017, p.5, 
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modifying not only the block of the intended transaction but also all the blocks thereafter by 
re-doing all the work previously done by the multitude of nodes and overtaking them in their 
current work.
61
  
Cryptocurrency market operation is sustained by different types of participants each 
performing different activities. The main groups, whose activities may be related to or have 
effect on tax evasion, are: 
1. Users – natural or legal persons operating with already existing (mined) units of 
cryptocurrencies which can be obtained in a variety of ways: received as a gift, purchased on 
exchange or from another user through peer-to-peer trading platform, received as a payment 
for goods, services or work, received through a hard fork (system update), mining or directly 
from coin offeror.
62
 Most of such income is subject to taxation. Likewise, the purposes 
cryptocurrencies are obtained for differ as well. The most common reasons for 
cryptocurrency acquisition are to use them for investment purposes, as a means of payment 
for personal remittances or as a medium of exchange in trade for goods or services.
63
 Due to 
the high volatility such purposes as savings are unlikely.  
2. Miners who obtain newly generated coins by resolving cryptographic puzzles through 
validation of transactions. The income miners receive for their work constitutes taxable 
return. However, currently the authorities have no access to the information about such 
income as no mechanism has been developed to detect when exactly and at what exchange 
rate new coins enter the circulation.
64
  
3. Exchange platforms being either pure cryptocurrency exchange or exchange to fiat 
currencies. Technically this is the easiest way to obtain and manage cryptocurrency funds and 
may include taxable funds of legal entities or individuals.  
4. Providers of cryptocurrency wallets which can be in form of software, hardware or 
custodian where the wallet provider actually holds the funds on behalf of the customers. A 
wallet is indispensable for receiving and keeping cryptocurrency assets therefore every tax 
evasion event done exploiting cryptocurrencies will involve a wallet.  
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5. Trading platforms providing peer-to-peer exchange. They often consist solely of a software 
without any identifiable human administrator
65
 and may be used to hide taxable transactions 
or assets.  
6. Merchants accepting cryptocurrencies – they can be engaged in tax evasion themselves not 
reporting taxable income or they can accept taxable assets on which tax has not been reported 
and/or paid.  
Other participants such as coin inventors, offerors, technical service providers, information 
providers
66
 are unlikely to affect the use of cryptocurrencies for tax evasion, therefore will 
not be dedicated further details. 
 
1.2. Properties of cryptocurrencies facilitating tax evasion  
 
Criminal behaviour of individuals in context of tax evasion has been analysed and explained 
from the perspectives of psychology, sociology and other sciences, however, it is best 
understood from economic point of view as the activity is primarily driven by financial 
goals.
67
 Individuals, assuming their rationality, seek to maximize their wellbeing and may 
choose to apply illegal means to achieve better results.
68
 Nonetheless, there is a cost for each 
crime that must be considered beforehand comparing with the potential return.
69
 The main 
component of the cost is the punishment. According to the tax evasion deterrence model, not 
only the severity of the punishment matters but also its probability (likelihood of detection) 
and proportionality.
70
 Additional elements that constitute the cost of crime are transaction 
costs, efficiency costs and reputation costs.
 71
  
The general advantages of cryptocurrencies over traditional means of payment are: (1) low 
transaction fees, (2) speed, (3) payment certainty (irreversibility of transactions), (4) global 
reach including financially underdeveloped countries, (5) personal data protection, (6) limited 
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interference of authorities.
72
 Most of these characteristics contribute to the suitability of 
cryptocurrencies for tax evasion and decrease the cost of the crime.  
The main concept of cryptocurrencies – anonymous peer-to-peer payment method 
independent of any authority – substantially encumbers the crime detection decreasing the 
likelihood of punishment to a petty level. As cryptocurrencies operate on software network 
which is not controlled or administered by a human intermediary, no identification 
information is (or can be) required and verified by the unmanned software when opening a 
cryptocurrency wallet or performing transactions. Although cryptocurrency transactions are 
publicly recorded and can be examined by anyone at any time,
73
 the users are identified only 
by their cryptocurrency addresses consisting of a line of random numbers, that are almost 
impossible to be traced back to their real-world identity
74
 indicating pseudo-anonymity of 
cryptocurrencies. Tracing of cryptocurrency transactions is complex and costly
75
 therefore it 
can be applied only in cases of prior suspicion of infringement, but not for systemic 
supervision.
76
 Establishing of suspicion in tax evasion cases may also be difficult as, on the 
contrary of money laundering and terrorism financing, the origin and destination of the funds 
in most cases are fully legal. The assets become illegal and the crime becomes effective only 
upon the lack of their inclusion in the tax declaration of the respective taxable period. 
Consequently, unless the recipient of the taxable income voluntarily reports it, the tax 
authorities are unlikely to discover it.
77
  
Additional means can be utilized to increase anonymity and reduce traceability. For example, 
while most cryptocurrencies are pseudo-anonymous, some cryptocurrencies use technologies 
that render them fully anonymous. Such cryptocurrencies are known as “privacy coins” 
providing strong privacy protection either by default or as an additional service.
78
 For 
instance, mixing technique accompanying the cryptocurrency Dash transactions is one of 
them. The funds are mixed with the funds of other users and returned to the initial user but 
each time in a different address thus obfuscating the real origin.
79
 Monero provides mixing of 
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account’s keys among users to obscure the identity of the remitters and receivers.80 It also 
creates stealth addresses through which the transactions are directed in order to confuse the 
trail.
81
 Zcash has created a system that generates the proof required by the blockchain to 
confirm the transaction without revealing any information save for the validity of the proof 
itself.
82
 These are but few of fully anonymous cryptocurrencies in the market.  
Currently the government authorities lack tools for tracing such anonymous transactions at 
all.
83
 High rewards have been announced by governments of different countries worldwide 
for creating and providing such tools.
 84
 For example, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security at the end of 2018 published a solicitation of applications of blockchain forensic 
analytics which may include any type of tool in any stage of development either general, 
extensible or providing only working approaches and which may be approached in any 
manner considering different data situation use cases requiring or not requiring additional 
data from other sources.
85
 It is explicitly indicated in the solicitation that a Bitcoin analytics 
problem has already been addressed previously and the current solicitation is aimed at the 
newer cryptocurrencies of enhanced privacy specifically pointing out Monero and Zcash. A 
more recent contract opportunity in the amount of GBP 100,000 for development or provision 
of a cryptocurrency transaction analytics tool in the beginning of 2020 was announced by the 
tax authority of the UK (HMRC). The main purpose for its search for such a tool is 
particularly the control and detection of tax liabilities of cryptocurrency users.
86
   
Other ways to reinforce the privacy protection are to create a different address for each 
transaction,
87
 to use offline wallets instead of online or custodian wallets, to use a Virtual 
Private Network or a private internet browsers such as Tor to obscure the IP address and 
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location of the user,
88
 use peer-to-peer trading platforms for transactions and ATMs for 
withdrawals instead of regulated exchanges, to utilize fork-merge structures dividing the 
payments into smaller amounts and re-joining afterwards, using temporary intermediate 
accounts as well as other techniques.
89
  
Another reason for hiding taxable assets in a cryptocurrency account is the lack of 
jurisdiction in charge. Cryptocurrencies by design are detached from any country or physical 
location.
90
 Cryptocurrency wallets operate in cyberspace which is “a world that is both 
everywhere and nowhere”.91 As there is no jurisdiction of actual location of the accumulating 
assets, they are not subject to taxation at source.
92
 Taking into account the anonymity and the 
unlikeliness of authorities to discover the taxable income unless it is expressly reported, the 
recently established framework against the traditional tax-evasion tools, namely international 
cooperation and information exchange between authorities, becomes irrelevant.
93
 In order to 
cooperate and exchange the information, the authorities need to be aware of the taxable assets 
which they are generally not.   
Identically to the absence of defined jurisdiction, cryptocurrencies lack also central 
administrator and supervisory authority. The major success in restraint of tax evasion via 
fiscal havens so far has been the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) for the 
USA and the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for the rest of the world. Accordingly, 
banks worldwide are required to share the financial information of foreign account holders to 
the tax authorities of their home countries.
94
 From financial services intermediaries the banks 
have become tax intermediaries.
95
 This success however is limited to the traditional financial 
services as no such regulations can be extended to cryptocurrency operations. Pseudo-
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anonymous and operated purely by software, cryptocurrency account data is for all intents 
and purposes impossible of being shared with tax authorities.
96
  
When assessed as a general benefit of cryptocurrencies, the cost of cryptocurrency 
transactions is noteworthy. The total cost of transactions depends on the cryptocurrency and 
the amount of transaction. For example, the cost for a small Bitcoin transaction in amount of 
USD 20 – 200 is approximately 2,85 % while for Ethereum it is 0,07 % and for Bitcoin Cash 
only 0,0047%.
97
 Increasing the amount of transaction, the fees decrease approaching 0%.
98
 At 
the same time international fiat currency transfers are substantially more expensive, banks 
charging 10,46 %, money transfer operators, which include the innovative fintech service 
providers, take 6,5 % and the mobile operators 3,14 % (2019 data).
99
  
Nevertheless, the cost of cryptocurrency transactions becomes even more appreciable when 
seen as a transaction cost of the tax evasion crime. Utilization of the traditional tax evasion 
tools such as entity registration and use of banking services in tax neutral jurisdictions 
protected by bank secrecy laws cause major expenses. The costs increase notably if additional 
services are used to hinder the detectability of the illicit activities, for instance, nominated 
director and shareholder services, virtual local offices etc. The costs may also increase along 
with the amount to be hidden as the evasion would become more difficult to achieve.
100
 On 
the other hand, the cost of cryptocurrencies is low and stays low notwithstanding the amount 
stored in the wallet. Moreover, cryptocurrency wallets can be created as many as needed free 
of cost or at the cost of hardware in case of the use of offline wallets. Hence, the efficiency of 
tax evasion crime does not have any additional cost.  
The effect of high transaction costs of crime is reduction of the return.
101
 Due to the high 
costs of the tax-free offshore services, previously only wealthy individuals could afford 
saving additional funds on taxes.
102
 The return must exceed the costs of incorporating the 
offshore entities, opening bank accounts, paying the usually high offshore bank fees, 
probably hiring and appointing nominee directors and other services. Now, however, with 
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cryptocurrencies everyone can stash some untaxed money in a cryptocurrency wallet, even 
small amounts that would be unprofitable if stored in a tax haven. 
Taking into account the above described properties of cryptocurrencies, the cost of tax 
evasion performed exploiting cryptocurrencies, can be assessed as very low. The likelihood 
of detection is reduced due to anonymity and limited traceability, while the transaction costs 
are low rendering high return. Such favourable conditions make cryptocurrencies particularly 
convenient for successful and profitable for tax evasion.  
The taxes can be evaded or tax liability artificially reduced by the exploitation of 
cryptocurrencies in the following ways: 
1. Receipt and non-reporting of any income subject to taxation.
103
 Given the favourable 
properties of the cryptocurrencies, reduced traceability and partial anonymity, any typically 
taxable transaction when performed using cryptocurrencies instead of regulated financial 
services poses risk of resulting in tax evasion. Such transactions may be salaries, wages,
104
 
gifts, income from sale of property, inheritance,
105
 as well as other payments, for example 
airdrops which are payments sent to the existing virtual currency addresses for advertising 
purposes of a new virtual currency
106
 and which is not practiced for fiat currencies.  
2. Maintaining a cryptocurrency wallet for business aside from the official accounting. Since 
the cryptocurrency wallets and transactions may be anonymous, corporate entities as well as 
professional individuals may maintain such wallets for receiving income for goods and 
services from their regular business activities.
107
 Such income may not get further included in 
the accounting, consequently not reported to the tax authorities and the respective tax not 
paid. 
4. Receiving income generated entirely by the cryptocurrency system. Such income includes 
remuneration for the mining activity and income from system updates (hard forks). The 
income from mining is not a typical salary or payment for professional services, nevertheless 
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it does increase the individual’s assets hence it constitute a taxable income.108 The system 
updates may occasionally generate additional income to the holders of the respective 
cryptocurrency. For example, on the 1
st
 August 2017 all the holders of Bitcoin received the 
same amount of Bitcoin Cash which was a new cryptocurrency created as a consequence of 
that update.
109
 Such forks occasionally happen, the additional coins are received by the 
cryptocurrency holders non-intentionally as they are awarded automatically, however they 
constitute a taxable income.  
5. Increase in value of the cryptocurrency.
110
 If the value of the cryptocurrency upon the 
disposal thereof has increased, the person has obtained gains. Here the details of each 
national legislation regarding the applicable tax regime and the time period of holding the 
cryptocurrency come into play, however such details are outside the scope of this thesis. 
8. Sophisticated legal arrangements may be structured taking advantage of the partial 
anonymity of the cryptocurrency transactions with the purpose to circumvent the tax 
obligations. Such arrangements would rather constitute legal but unwanted tax avoidance 
than illicit tax evasion. Nevertheless, the purpose is equivalent – tax minimization therefore 
these arrangements deserve short insight. A commonly practiced arrangement is tax-free 
borrowing of cash using the cryptocurrency as a collateral instead of selling it with taxable 
gains.
111
 A sample of a more complicated arrangement might be investment in traded 
securities or commodities through a third-party tax exempt agent using a cryptocurrency 
swap contract. As a result, a cryptocurrency owner transfers a certain amount of the 
cryptocurrencies to the investor who purchases the planned investment (stock, commodities 
etc.), holds, sells as instructed, pays the dividends, if any, and pays appreciation or receives 
depreciation from the cryptocurrency owner upon the sale of the asset.
112
 Even more complex 
arrangements could be constructed taking advantage of the different legal status and 
regulatory requirements of cryptocurrencies in different jurisdictions depending on the 
creativity and agility of the tax specialist.  
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2. Regulation of cryptocurrencies targeting tax evasion 
 
The previous chapter introduced cryptocurrencies and explained their suitability for tax 
evasion. This chapter will deal with the countermeasures – the regulation of cryptocurrencies 
targeted to prevent and reduce their exploitation as a tool for tax evasion. In the first 
subchapter, the regulatory challenges will be identified. The legislation in force in the EU 
aimed at prevention of tax evasion and its applicability to the cryptocurrencies will be 
analysed in the second subchapter. 
The first cryptocurrency Bitcoin was created in 2008 that coincides with the time of the 
global financial crisis. Its quick approval and the subsequent growth of popularity was 
stimulated by the imprudent activities and inattentive customer service by the banks during 
that time
113
 which were blamed for “parasitic business-model” earning great income with 
scarce effort.
114
Additionally, such advantages of cryptocurrencies as the cost and speed of 
transactions, global reach, financial inclusion and independence from intermediaries and 
authorities
115
 pose serious competition to the banking services. Only the recently developing 
fintech technologies which include innovative payment services software, for example, 
mobile payment apps, may in such aspects as cost and efficiency match the performance of 
cryptocurrencies. By altering the competitive dimensions of the banking industry and the 
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settled behaviour of its customers,
116
 cryptocurrencies disrupt the traditional financial 
services market requiring due attention.  
The first arising question is whether the new technology should be regulated in any 
particular way or should the market be left free.
117
 Disruptive innovations have been made at 
all times throughout the history, however, previously it could take even up to centuries to 
fully introduce the changes in the market and society
118
. Accordingly, the regulations used to 
develop slowly and naturally along with the expansion of the respective technologies. 
However, today with the rapid development of innovation and the global spread thereof, 
creation of novel regulations becomes pressing.
119
 
Initially cryptocurrencies were used by small communities of IT-savvy people and there was 
no necessity to regulate the trade as the market capitalization was low and the small number 
of the involved people were mostly fully aware of the operational processes and the 
prospective outcomes. Growing the expansion of the use of cryptocurrencies, international 
organizations started drawing attention of the national and international regulators to the 
possible adverse consequences of the underregulation of the cryptocurrency transactions. In 
the “Opinion on ‘Virtual Currencies’” of 2014 the European Banking Authority (EBA) listed 
70 risks of different nature and gravity of the use of cryptocurrencies.
120
 The risk of tax 
evaders obtaining income in virtual currencies outside monitored fiat currency payment 
systems is indicated under the risks to financial integrity and is ranked as medium regarding 
the necessity to create efficient regulation and supervision.
121
 European Parliamentary 
Research Service (EPRS) in the same year, while admitting that cryptocurrencies have “high 
potential for tax evasion”, clarified that the scale of tax evasion was not likely to be high as 
the number of Bitcoins available was not large enough and its volatility in value was too 
high.
122
 In its briefing the EPRS analysed only Bitcoin as the market capitalization of the 
other cryptocurrencies at that time was too insignificant.  
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Since the issue of the above cited EPRS briefing the situation has changed substantially. 
Although the number of Bitcoins has increased only by 50 % (from 12,6 million in the 2
nd
 
quarter of 2012 to 18,3 million in the 1
st
 quarter of 2020),
123
 the number of cryptocurrencies 
existing in the market has grown from a few dozens in 2014 to more than 5500 in 2020
124
 and 
the total market capitalization thereof has increased from 6 billion USD in April 2014 to 220 
billion in April 2020.
125
 With the current expansion of cryptocurrencies the EPRS argument 
about the scale of tax evasion cannot be relied on anymore and taxes can be evaded in as 
large amounts as any entity or individual may intend. Hence, the regulation targeting 
exploitation of cryptocurrencies for tax evasion purpose has turned indispensable.  
 
2.1. Regulatory challenges 
2.1.1. The regulator 
To produce the regulation, the initial task is to determine who the regulator will be. The 
typical process of sovereign governments issuing laws in their own countries is not applicable 
to cryptocurrencies. The main reason is the intrinsically global nature of cryptocurrencies in 
contrast to the geographically limited reach of the national governments. Cryptocurrencies 
operate in the Cyberspace which has no geographic limitations, it may include all the 
jurisdictions each of them willing to produce their own regulation
126
 according to their own 
criteria. Fragmentation through national legislation may cause severe inconsistencies
127
 
especially when international operation is concerned as is the case of cryptocurrencies.  
In this aspect counter tax evasion regulation is particularly complicated. Tax sovereignty 
granting the states full authority to regulate taxation of their residents and citizens is a 
fundamental concept in the international arena.
128
 This concept is maintained within the 
operation of the EU as the tax laws of direct taxes (income and corporate) have not been 
harmonized provided that they do not affect the fundamental freedoms and operation of the 
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common market.
129
 The taxation system of the USA in this sense is in a more advantageous 
position as the Internal Revenue Service is in charge of taxation regulation, enforcement and 
tax-evasion combat. Having only one institution in charge is more efficient in terms of costs 
and resources and may also be more effective in achieving results.  
Moreover, conflicts between the national tax laws of different countries may create such 
inconsistencies where tax avoidance is rendered fully legal.
130
 Especially in the current digital 
age where the income is generated globally lack of a unified tax regime or at least basic 
criteria thereof permits the taxpayers to choose the most convenient tax regime for their 
purposes consequently generating stateless income which is not subject to taxation in any 
jurisdiction.
131
 The academic and tax expert Piergiorgio Valente has qualified such 
inconsistent patchwork of different tax regimes as a “pathological system”.132  
Lacking unified taxation regulations, a complex international network has been created to 
deal solely with the evasion of taxes allegedly due to any country respecting the tax 
sovereignty and the differences in the tax regimes. Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters, Common Reporting Standard and Automatic Exchange of 
Information require cooperation between the tax agencies of the countries acting on behalf of 
each other applying their own tax regime and criteria thereof. The same problem exists within 
the EU. Nevertheless, only when elevated to a sufficiently international level the combat with 
the offshore tax evasion became successful.
133
 Likewise, the same must be true for 
cryptocurrency regulation due to their international nature. 
As the necessity for a global regulation is established and the national governments having 
been admitted insufficient due to their limited geographical reach, the level and method of 
international cooperation must be determined. International treaties comprising nearly all the 
jurisdictions in the world are occasionally being signed especially in the areas of human 
rights, peacekeeping, environment protection and others, so it might be expected that certain 
regulation of cryptocurrencies might be achieved this way. Nevertheless, two important 
drawbacks of treaty regulation are the excessive time that is required for the elaboration and 
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signing of a treaty as well as the willingness of the countries to surrender their liberty of 
action in the respective domain. The more stringent the rules intended, the higher possibility 
for the countries not signing the treaty become havens in the respective field.
134
 As taxing and 
tax evasion prevention are particularly sensitive subject for many countries, it is highly 
unlikely to be included in a willingly concluded treaty. It may require stricter measures to 
convince or force non-willing countries to cooperate in order to reach efficient globally 
unified anti-tax evasion regulation on cryptocurrencies.   
At the same time, such option as self-regulation must not be overlooked as it is recommended 
by academic experts in a form of concession between government regulators and market 
participants,
 135
 and is currently practiced in regulation of other areas of international digital 
services such as search engines, social media platforms, e-commerce platforms and others 
(Google, Facebook, Amazon etc.).
136
 The control of the Cyberspace from outside is 
difficult
137
 hence to reach efficiency of the regulation, cooperation between the regulators and 
the regulated is indispensable.
138
   
 
2.1.2. Legal framework 
Not only the fragmentation between the countries is problematic in elaboration of efficient 
regulation of cryptocurrency operations. Cryptocurrencies comprise characteristics of 
different currently known and used instruments such as money, commodities, property, 
payment systems.
139
  
As indicated by the denomination, the cryptocurrencies are intended to constitute money 
alternative to fiat currencies such as EUR, USD, CHF etc. They were created as “electronic 
cash” exchangeable peer-to-peer online worldwide.140 Nonetheless, while money may have 
different definitions in academic, legal and economic literature, cryptocurrencies do not 
include some important properties of money such as issuance and control of the state, 
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physical representation in bills and coins,
141
 mandatory acceptance in the designated territory, 
use as an independent unit of account and ability to serve as a reliable store of value due to 
volatility.
 142 
 
Some countries of the EU and outside, including Austria, Czech Republic and USA, have 
admitted cryptocurrencies as commodities for taxation purposes placing them among gold, 
oil, corn and other goods and products. In the EU commodities are defined by the Regulation 
supplementing the EU Directive on markets in financial instruments as  
goods of a fungible nature that are capable of being delivered, including metals and their ores and 
alloys, agricultural products, and energy such as electricity.
143
  
Cryptocurrencies cannot be considered goods and are not capable of being physically 
delivered. Another characteristic of commodities is the intrinsic value of the goods comprised 
under the term “commodities”. Cryptocurrencies have no intrinsic value, they are just digital 
representation of value which is determined solely by the supply and demand.
144
 And 
ultimately, the pseudo-anonymous cryptocurrencies (the ones that do not use enhanced 
anonymity measures and which comprise the majority of the cryptocurrencies available on 
the market, for instance, Bitcoin, Ripple, Stellar) are actually not fungible although they were 
intended upon their creation to be fungible just like the bills and coins of fiat money. Due to 
the information recorded of each unit of a particular cryptocurrency on the public ledger, the 
history of each unit can be traced back to its beginning, and currently many exchanges and 
merchants tend not to accept the cryptocurrencies which have in their past been connected or 
suspected to be connected with illicit or questionable activity.
145
 Consequently the value of 
the ‘dirty units’ actually differ from the value of the ‘clean units’ making them unfungible. 
For the above reasons, cryptocurrencies do not correspond to the EU definition of 
commodities therefore they are not commodities per se.  
The aim of the intent to qualify the cryptocurrencies under one of the above categories is to 
determine whether it is possible to place them under a pre-existing regulatory frame-work, of 
course, introducing respective amendments, or is an entirely new legislation required. It will 
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also determine which agencies at the national level will control and supervise them and which 
tax regime will be applied at currently non-unified sovereign national level. It will also 
determine which legal acts exactly will need to be amended to include the requirements 
aimed at tax evasion prevention.  
 
2.1.3. Subjects of the regulation  
The subjects of the taxation legislation have always been directly the taxpayers – individuals 
and corporations who, upon receiving taxable income, have the duty to report it and pay the 
corresponding taxes on it. However, not all the individuals and corporations do so. As on the 
contrary of money laundering and terrorism financing the income of the tax evaders may be 
comprised of fully legal transactions, they are little likely to be spotted as suspicious 
transactions and thus reported to the respective authorities. For this reason, the only way to 
deal with the tax evasion efficiently is by furnishing the tax authorities full information of the 
total global income of the taxpayers. Hence, the tax evasion prevention legislation targets the 
entities that are in possession of such information. Those are the intermediaries inevitably 
required for the execution of transactions of the taxpayers – banks and other financial 
institutions. Only by receiving complete information of the total global income of a taxpayer, 
the authority can detect any unreporting or underreporting thereof.  It also places the 
taxpayers in the position where they have hardly any opportunity to hide the revenue from the 
authorities and successfully avoid paying taxes on it.
146
 The Internal Revenue Service of the 
USA has admitted that it is almost impossible to detect tax evasion without international 
reporting only by using the local tools such as tax audits.
147
 Furthermore, the experts of the 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union have declared 
in the Working paper on International Tax Evasion that fighting international tax evasion is 
“all about information sharing.”148  
Initiatives to establish international exchange of information with different scope, 
geographical coverage and different levels of success have been present for the last three 
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decades.
149
 The latest and the most successful initiatives in this regard have been the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) introduced by the USA and the Common Reporting 
Standard (CRS) as a part of  the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) which require 
the banks and financial institutions globally to report the balances of the non-resident 
accounts to the respective tax authorities.
150
 For instance, the CRS refers to the custodian, 
depositary and investment services providers such as banks, brokers, investment funds.
151
 
The AMLD includes even wider scope of obliged entities such as financial and credit 
institutions, auditors, accountants, tax advisors, notaries, trust service providers, estate agents, 
gambling service providers, traders of expensive goods receiving cash payments, and traders 
of expensive art works. Part of the above entities are obliged to report under the AMLD not 
being obliged under other tax evasion prevention legislation as the scope of the AMLD is 
wider and aimed primarily at combatting money laundering and terrorism financing, not only 
tax evasion.
152
 
Nonetheless, the decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies disrupts the traditional regulatory 
model as there is no central intermediary to regulate.
153
 Although the record of all the 
transactions is publicly available, they do not contain any identifying information about the 
payers or receivers of the funds.
154
 Only a line of digits is recorded that represents the wallets 
of the transaction parties however, such wallets may be created in anonymous way and each 
user may create any number thereof.
155
  
The experts, such as R. Houben
156
 and P. Valente
157
, claim that the primary task of the 
regulation of cryptocurrencies is to unveil the anonymity. However, for many 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero and others that operate on permissionless 
blockchains, there is no one who might bear this duty and request the identifying information 
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from the users. The ledger is maintained by independent nodes which only technically 
confirm the transactions. The exchange may take place peer-to-peer on trading platforms 
operated purely by software. Other ways exist to trade cryptocurrencies outside the regulated 
exchanges. The wallets can also be operated only by software and even created offline. No 
identification is carried out to access the account. The balance therein simply belongs to an 
individual who has the “password” (the private key).158  
In a way the cryptocurrency accounts resemble bearer shares through which the company 
equity belongs to the person who physically possesses the share certificate thereof – just a 
paper without any names. Following the FATF Recommendations of 2012,
159
 the bearer 
shares have been prohibited in most countries in the world or immobilized in the few other 
such as Luxembourg, Panama and BVI, in order to prevent their use for money laundering 
and tax evasion. When comparing with cryptocurrencies, bearer shares did not have any 
major additional benefits than the anonymity and quick transfer therefore their elimination 
could not be strongly objected. Cryptocurrencies, on the other hand, cannot be so easily 
banned as they provide additional benefits not only regarding the cryptocurrency payments 
(speed of transactions, global reach, inclusion of financially underdeveloped territories) but 
also the technological progress and innovation which must not be bluntly halted.  
The picture looks better regarding cryptocurrencies operated on permissioned blockchains. 
Here the regulations to certain extent can be directed to the owners or administrators of the 
blockchains although such extent could rarely fully cover tax evasion prevention as the 
administrators usually approve the participants of the cryptocurrency network (the nodes) but 
do not control their operation and transactions, however different degrees of control are 
possible.
160
  
Other addressees of regulations include the existing intermediaries that currently operate in 
the market. Such intermediaries need not be created by governments as they are usually 
created by the market itself. On the contrary to the original cryptocurrency concept to evade 
trust and third party services, the intermediaries are not simply agents of the transacting 
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parties but with their services provide added value to the market.
161
 The intermediaries that 
have emerged in the cryptocurrency sector are commonly used in practice due to 
convenience, easier use or other reasons.
162
 For instance, such intermediaries might operate 
on a more user-friendly software, have personalized approach including customer service and 
troubleshooting, no need to remember or keep safe the private keys since access may be re-
gained in the personal e-mail using “forgot password” option and many other benefits that are 
not provided by a simple decentralized software. Nevertheless, the regulated exchanges 
performing full Due Diligence on their customers are little likely to be utilized when 
intending to hide the assets from tax authorities if software operated unmanned alternatives 
are easily available in the market.  
 
2.1.4. Overregulation  
There are several harms that excessive requirements regarding customer identification and 
reporting of the transactions or account balances would do to the cryptocurrencies. Firstly, 
such requirements will substantially reduce one of their main advantages – the low cost of 
transactions. Maintaining an adequate, professional and efficient compliance department in 
financial institutions incurs considerable costs. For instance, the average direct annual cost of 
compliance per financial institution in the US and Canada is approximately USD 14 
million
163
 while in the Western European countries (France, Italy, Netherlands, Germany and 
Switzerland) the average exceeds USD 20 million.
164
 The salaries to qualified specialists are 
quite high correlating with their responsibility and constitute 74% of the total compliance 
cost.
165
 Eventually the clients are required to cover these costs by paying higher fees and 
charges. If cryptocurrency service providers were subjected to similar compliance 
requirements, they would need to charge considerably higher fees from their customers.  
The increase in fees for the services would consequently reduce the amount of 
cryptocurrency users. Even if the fees were still lower than the fees in the banking sector, for 
the reason of convenience, habit or lack of motivation the users might continue using the 
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bank services or turn to fintech providers. Alternatively, they can turn from transparent 
cryptocurrency service providers to the “underground” market.166 Reduced interest in 
cryptocurrencies would also hinder the technological progress and innovation.
167
 Such 
condition is not encouraged as apart from cryptocurrencies the use of distributed ledger and 
blockchain technologies has great potential in other areas.
168
  
Additionally, such requirements would entirely destroy the original concept of the 
cryptocurrencies as transactions with no need to trust to a third party. Nevertheless, most 
cryptocurrency users today are not troubled by the “original idea” of the cryptocurrencies as 
the use of cryptocurrencies has passed from the ideological level to the practical level and a 
great part of transactions in cryptocurrencies are actually done through intermediaries.
169
  
 
2.2. Assessment of the current regulation 
 
The tax evasion prevention legislation in the EU has formed taking into account the following 
two aspects: 
(a) the taxation is not harmonized in the EU but instead is governed by each Member State 
independently and supervised by distinct tax authorities; and  
(b) the tax evasion combat globally is based on information sharing between tax authorities or 
from financial institutions to tax authorities. 
Consequently, the primary purpose of such legislation is creation of a network of cooperation 
between the tax administrations of the Member States and constant improvement of its 
efficiency. In regard to tax administration the European Commission emphasizes that the 
duty of taxation and combat with tax fraud and evasion pertains to the Member States, 
however, the EU competence is to provide respective legislation as well as IT and other 
means for effective cooperation and exchange of information between the national tax 
                                                 
166
 Marc Hochstein et al, Beyond KYC: Regulators Set to Adopt Tough New Rules for Crypto Exchanges, 
11.06.2019, available on: 
https://www.coindesk.com/beyond-kyc-global-regulators-appear-set-to-adopt-tough-new-rules-for-crypto-
exchanges, accessed 11.11.2019.  
167
 IMF, supra note 21, p.25. 
168
 Houben and Snyers, supra note 31, p.17. 
169
 IMF, supra note 21, p.25. 
37 
 
authorities of the Member States.
170
 According to the EU Action plan against tax fraud and 
tax evasion, improvement of cooperation between the tax administrations is the key objective.  
The main EU legislative acts in force aimed at combatting tax evasion and tax fraud are the 
following: 
1) Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the 
recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures; 
2) Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15
th
 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the 
field of taxation (DAC) and all the subsequent amendments thereof; 
3) Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing (AMLD) and its amendment of 30 May 2018 (AMLD5); 
4) Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax 
avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market (ATAD); 
5) 2012/772/EU: Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 on aggressive tax 
planning. 
Anti-abuse provisions to prevent tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning are included in 
other directives such as directives on interest and royalties, mergers and parent subsidiaries. 
However, these provisions, primarily regulate corporate structures and arrangements, and do 
not refer to cryptocurrency transactions directly. For this reason, these directives are out of 
the scope of this research and their provisions will not be further examined here.  
 
2.2.1. Directive against tax avoidance practices 
The Directive 2016/1164 on rules against tax avoidance practices (ATAD) refers solely to 
corporate taxpayers. Its main purpose is to prevent typical trans-border practices and 
arrangements used by corporate entities to reduce their taxes exploiting the differences in the 
tax regimes of different jurisdictions. Previously only the jurisdictions of the EU were 
covered, currently after the amendments of the Directive of 2017 the use of tax benefits of the 
third countries are included in the scope of ATAD.  
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Cryptocurrencies are taxed differently in different jurisdictions. Typically, in most countries 
for taxation purposes they are treated either as property or commodity. The differences in the 
applicable regimes as well as inconsistencies between the jurisdictions within the same 
regime may be used to artificially but entirely legally reduce the tax liability. For example – 
preferential tax regime on cryptocurrency investments that have been held for more than one 
year in Germany. However, currently such situations are not covered by the Directive. While 
the Directive regulates hybrid mismatches in case of financial instruments treated differently 
for tax purposes in different jurisdictions, cryptocurrencies are not covered by the financial 
instrument definition. According to the Article 2 (9) (j) of the Directive, “financial 
instruments” are equity, derivatives or such instruments that generate financing or equity 
return taxable as debt. Cryptocurrencies do not correspond to any of the instruments included 
in the definition.  
 
2.2.2. Directive on recovery of claims 
The Directive 2010/24 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims regulates a later stage 
of taxation where the taxable basis is already known to the tax authority and a claim for 
recovery of such taxes is issued. The scope of the Directive is defined in the Section 2 
thereof. Accordingly, the Directive applies to  
all taxes and duties of any kind levied by or on behalf of a Member State or its territorial or 
administrative subdivisions, including the local authorities, or on behalf of the Union.
171
  
Hence it may include taxes on cryptocurrency transactions provided that the respective 
institutions of a Member State have already issued a recovery order for such taxes. At this 
stage, recovery claims of taxes on cryptocurrency related activities are in no way treated 
differently from claims on any other taxes therefore they do not require any specific 
indication that cryptocurrency transactions related taxes are included in the scope of the 
Directive. Thus the application of this directive in the field of cryptocurrency operations does 
not pose any particular problems comparing with taxes in other fields as long as the tax 
authorities have at their disposal the information of the taxable bases of the taxpayers. To 
benefit from this Directive, obtaining the information on the cryptocurrency transactions of 
taxpayers is essential.  
                                                 
171
 Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims 
relating to taxes, duties and other measures. 
39 
 
 
2.2.3. Directive on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation 
The Directive 2011/16 (DAC) regulates the cooperation between the EU Member States 
regarding taxation. The primary aim of the Directive is to facilitate the tax authorities of the 
Member States access to the information necessary to carry out fair and proper taxation. 
According to the point (a) of the Article 8 (3) of DAC the Member States are required to take 
the necessary measures including legislative and administrative, to ensure that the reporting 
financial institutions perform sufficient due diligence procedures on their customers and 
provide the determined reportable information to the tax authorities. The Annex I of the 
Directive defines and provides further details on the reporting entities and reportable accounts 
among other items. However, it is not certain whether all the services providers involved in 
issuing, trading or exchanging cryptocurrencies are included in the scope of this Directive.
172
   
The section VIII (3) of the Annex I of DAC defines the reporting financial institutions 
encompassed by the Directive which are custodial institutions, depository institutions, 
investment entities and specified insurance companies. The two latter ones due to their 
particularities of business do not comprise cryptocurrency businesses. However, the nature of 
business of depository and custodial institutions may include some categories of 
cryptocurrency service providers.  
In regard to depository institutions, the definition in the Annnex I of the DAC states that a 
“depository institution” is an “Entity that accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking 
or similar business”.173 The term “deposit” is defined in the Directive on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes as a credit balance resulting from funds left in an account or from temporary 
situations of normal banking transactions and which a credit institution is required to repay 
according to the terms of contract and which exclude financial instruments.
174
 “Depository 
account” according to the Section VIII C 2 of the Annex I of DAC may include commercial, 
checking or savings accounts or any account for which a certificate of deposit, investment or 
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indebtedness or a similar instrument is issued.
175
 Nevertheless, the Directive on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms requires that the credit institutions taking deposits must be authorized for 
doing so and taking deposits or other repayable funds from the public without such 
authorization is prohibited.
176
 Hence the cryptocurrency service companies will not form part 
of this category unless they are expressly authorized for this activity. Such authorizations at 
the current level of cryptocurrency regulation is unlikely and may exist only in exceptional 
cases.  
According to the further explanation in the Section VII of Annex I of DAC, the custodial 
institutions are the ones that hold financial assets on behalf of their customers and custodial 
accounts are the ones where any one of more financial assets are held for the benefit of 
another person. The term “financial assets” is defined as including securities (such as shares 
of stock, notes, bonds, debentures, or other evidence of indebtedness), commodities, swaps, 
insurance contract or annuity contract, or any interest therein including futures, forward 
contracts or options. The question is whether custodian wallets of cryptocurrencies or 
exchange platforms can be included in the category of the custodial institutions or, in order to 
correspond to the definitions, whether the cryptocurrencies may be considered “financial 
assets”.  
While some member states such as Austria and Czech Republic have qualified 
cryptocurrencies as commodities for taxation purposes, the cryptocurrencies do not 
correspond to commodities definition of the EU Directive on markets in financial 
instruments
177
 and to the general concept of commodities due to the lack of physical 
representation and intrinsic value.
178
 Some cryptocurrencies present the characteristics of 
securities, however most do not.
179
 As a result, the Directive may be applied to 
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cryptocurrency service providers according to the interpretation and qualification of 
cryptocurrencies in each Member State, however, as there is no explicit qualification of 
cryptocurrencies, preferably at the EU level, as any of the financial instruments included in 
the definition of financial assets of DAC, they cannot be strictly considered falling under the 
scope of the Directive as custodial institutions.  
As a result, unless the cryptocurrency issuers, as well as trading and exchange platforms are 
explicitly included in DAC definition of reporting financial institutions, there will be 
difficulties and inconsistencies in the application of this Directive in efficient way. Moreover, 
even if cryptocurrency service providers become explicitly included, additional problem is 
collecting the information, especially about the cryptocurrency accounts that are not 
custodian such as offline and software wallets as well as transactions performed on peer-to-
peer trading platforms. Nonetheless, cryptocurrency ledger is decentralized, no jurisdiction 
can require information about all the account holders of certain cryptocurrencies as none has 
that information. 
 
2.2.4. Anti-money laundering Directive 
The first and only tax evasion regulating legislative act currently in force in the EU explicitly 
including cryptocurrency service providers in its scope, is the Directive 2015/849 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and particularly 
its amendment of 30 May 2018 (AMLD 5).  
The first EU directive on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering was adopted in 1991 (AMLD 1).
180
 A decade later, in 2001, it was 
amended in order to bring it in line with the FATF recommendations (AMLD 2).
181
 Amended 
once again in 2006 (AMLD 3),
182
 the directive was entirely replaced in 2015 (AMLD 4).
183
 
                                                 
180
 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purpose of money laundering, OJ L 166, 28.6.1991, p. 77–82, available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A31991L0308, accessed: 10.05.2020. 
181
 Section (7) of Recitals, Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 
2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose 
of money laundering - Commission Declaration, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 76–82, available on: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32001L0097, accessed 10.05.2020. 
182
 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention 
of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, OJ L 309, 
 
42 
 
Although auditors, accountants and tax advisors were for the first time included among the 
obliged institutions under the Directive in the AMLD 2, initially the reason thereof was that 
services of such professionals might be misused for the purpose of laundering proceeds 
gained from criminal activities.
184
 However, in the AMLD 4, the tax crimes were explicitly 
included in the definition of “criminal activity” according to the revised FATF 
Recommendations.
185
  
The following amendment of the AMLD in 2018 brought cryptocurrency transactions and 
certain categories of the respective service providers under the scope of the Directive. The 
term “virtual currencies” is used in the Directive instead of the term “cryptocurrencies” so as 
to include wider range of products as cryptocurrencies refer to only a part of virtual 
currencies that are decentralized, exchangeable peer-to-peer, convertible to/from fiat 
currencies and protected by cryptography.
186
 According to the points (g) and (h) of the 
Article 2 of the Directive, the providers of exchange services between virtual currencies and 
fiat currencies as well as custodian wallet providers are obliged entities under the Directive.  
The obliged entities have two main duties according to AMLD: (1) to perform Due 
Diligence, including beneficial ownership information, on their customers and prospective 
customers; and (2) to report any transactions where the obliged entity suspects or has grounds 
to suspect that they may involve proceeds from illicit activity.  
The requirement to perform Due Diligence on cryptocurrency users ends one of the principal 
concerns in regard to cryptocurrency businesses – the anonymity. Nevertheless, this concern 
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is resolved only partly as only few of the cryptocurrency service providers are covered by the 
ALMD5.  
There are different types of service providers that may deal with cryptocurrencies which are 
not covered by the AMLD.  In regard to cryptocurrency exchanges, only the entities that 
provide exchange services between cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies are included in the 
scope of the AMLD. Nevertheless, there are other types of exchanges that operate in the 
market such as pure cryptocurrency exchanges which may be decentralized as well as 
centralized, and peer-to-peer trading platforms.  
It is assumed that the users after performing transactions in virtual currencies, eventually will 
need to “cash out” the cryptocurrency and exchange it for fiat currency187 in order to fully 
benefit from the value received. Hence the EU Commission has opted for targeting the 
cryptocurrency exchange platforms that provide such link between the world of 
cryptocurrencies and the “real economy”.188  
While such assumption was valid in the first years of the circulation of cryptocurrencies when 
the market capitalization was low and the number of users was limited, the situation changed 
in 2017 after the great increase in price, popularity and total market capitalization of Bitcoin. 
At the current scale of operations such argument is no longer true. Nowadays there are 
companies of all types of businesses which accept cryptocurrency payments for their products 
or services. They include all the necessary provisions for life as well as luxury items, online 
and offline services, real estate, travel and entertainment, retail stores and many other 
business sectors.
189
 There is no more need to exchange the cryptocurrencies for fiat 
currencies to obtain the maximum benefit from them.  
As pure virtual currency exchanges are not included in the AMLD, they are not required to 
perform Due Diligence on their customers therefore the users of such exchanges can operate 
anonymously outside the regulated environment. Such possibility has been admitted by the 
EU Commission. In its Staff Working Document of 2016 on amendments to the AMLD the 
Commission states that the most pressing concern is the cryptocurrency exchanges that 
connect the cryptocurrencies with the real economy indicating that in the future 
cryptocurrencies may develop to such point where the necessity to exchange them for fiat 
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currencies is eliminated due to their wide acceptance and use.
190
 The working document was 
issued in 2016 when cryptocurrencies were less widely used, however the amendments 
including virtual currency service providers in the AMLD were adopted in 2018 after the 
bitcoin expansion therefore the EU should have included the pure cryptocurrency exchanges 
in the scope of the AMLD, at least the centralized exchanges in order to better attain the goal 
of enabling competent authorities to monitor the use of virtual currencies through obliged 
entities as stated in the recitals of the AMLD.
191
 Decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges as 
well as peer-to-peer trading platforms need not be included as their regulation would be 
difficult to enforce due to the lack of human control over such exchanges.  
In regard to cryptocurrency wallets, only the custodian wallets are covered by the directive 
leaving the software and hardware wallets outside the scope. While this leaves more options 
for the virtual currency users to hide assets including taxable income in such wallets 
anonymously, inclusion of non-custodian wallets in the scope of the directive would be 
difficult to enforce due to the lack of real human persons behind the apps, software or 
hardware means.  
EU admits that regulation of the entities currently included in the scope of the AMLD will 
not entirely resolve the issue of anonymity as transactions can also be done by other means 
circumventing the newly regulated entities.
192
  
On the other hand, the duty of reporting suspicious transactions contains various problematic 
aspects as well.  
Firstly, not all the tax evasion cases are covered by the AMLD. The “criminal activity” 
encompassed by the Directive is defined in the Article 3(4) as “any kind of involvement in 
the commission” of the serious crimes listed in the following subsections (a) – (f) thereof.193 
Hence, it is made clear that the Directive deals only with “serious crimes” and does not 
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consider small misdemeanours which may be criminalized in some Member States or 
constitute administrative offences in others. Point (f) of the Article 3(4) describes the tax 
crimes that are considered under the Directive. Those are all offences in connection with 
direct or indirect taxes which are penalized by national legislation of the Member States with 
maximum of more than one year imprisonment or if the national legislation provides only for 
minimum threshold for punishments, where the minimum punishment for the tax crime is 
more than six months. This means that only very serious tax crimes are included in the scope. 
For example, according to the Latvian Criminal code only tax crimes that have caused losses 
of large scale to the State or local Governments are penalized with punishments that 
correspond to the AMLD definition. Although large scale is not defined in the Criminal 
Code, the State Revenue Service of the Republic of Latvia clarifies that criminal 
responsibility for tax crimes compatible with AMLD arises when the total amount of taxes 
evaded exceeds 50 minimum monthly salaries
194
 which in total equals to EUR 21,500 
according to the data of 2020. The Criminal Code of Spain in this sense is more generous 
imposing penalty of the required level only starting from the total amount of EUR 120,000 of 
taxes evaded in a year.
195
  
Accordingly, only tax crimes of high amounts evaded may become reported leaving most 
regular tax evaders out of the scope. Taking into account the nature, low cost and easy use of 
cryptocurrencies in contrast to the high cost and complexity of the use of offshore corporate 
structures and bank accounts in tax havens, the tax evasion exploiting cryptocurrencies 
practiced in small amounts by individuals of different income may be substantially more 
common than the same activities performed by big corporation or wealthy entrepreneurs 
involving high volumes of capital. For this reason, it can be concluded that the AMLD has 
only minor impact on tax evasion prevention in general and especially concerning 
cryptocurrencies.  
Another problematic aspect of the suspicious transaction reporting requirement under the 
AMLD is that the Directive does not provide any definition, characteristics or description of 
the term “suspicious transaction”.196 It only indicates that transactions must be reported 
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where the “obliged entity knows, suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds … 
are the proceeds of criminal activity or are related to terrorist financing”.197 Article 8 of 
AMLD lists the possible risk factors to be assessed – customers themselves, countries or 
regions of operation, products/services, transactions and delivery channels. The further 
assessment, however, is left at the discretion of the service providers/entities obliged to 
report. The Financial Intelligence Group of EUROPOL on its research about suspicious 
transaction reports explains that the suspicion is based on the reporting entity’s “feeling of 
apprehension or mistrust” on the transaction itself or on the persons involved.198  
Nevertheless, some common characteristics and red flags on transactions in traditional 
financial services market have been developed over time. In its research the Financial 
Intelligence group has analysed the filed suspicious transaction reports and the reasons for 
considering the transactions suspicious and filing the reports. The most common factor 
prompting suspicion is the use of cash which accounts for 5 % of the filed suspicious 
transaction reports. According to the research, other red flags are economic background of 
the account user, use of forged documents, transactions with high-risk countries, transactions 
via correspondent banks, use of money service businesses to remit funds, offshore based 
companies, use of front persons/companies among other less frequent factors. However, such 
red flags are not always applicable for the virtual currency transactions. For instance, 
transactions through correspondent banks or money services could not be used as a 
suspicious factor as the cryptocurrencies services companies themselves might be in the high-
risk zone within this factor. Likewise transfers to/from high-risk or offshore countries cannot 
always be detected as cryptocurrencies are transferred purely in the cyberspace with no 
geographic limitations. While not all typical traditional financial market risk signals can be 
used on cryptocurrencies, their own red flags are not yet fully detected or sufficiently 
understood hence the suspicious transaction report filing initially may be inadequate.
199
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Additional problem with the suspicious transaction reports is connected directly with the tax 
evasion. The tax crimes of certain level of gravity are explicitly included in the scope of the 
AMLD therefore the reporting entities are compelled to report transactions that may cause the 
feeling of suspicion of tax evasion. The question is – how to reasonably assess the 
transactions from the perspective of tax compliance if the origin and destination of the funds 
may be fully legal and the funds my become illegal only after the end of tax reporting period. 
The first option is to suspect that all transactions may result incompliant with the tax 
obligations unless the reporting entity has proof that the income has been reported or that the 
tax has been paid. The second option is to assume that the customers do comply with their tax 
obligations consequently reporting only the transactions about which the reporting entity has 
founded lack of confidence on the customer tax compliance.  
The first option may generate many needless reports where the customers would have 
complied with their tax obligations while the reporting entity would not have been informed 
about it, or the transaction may not be subject to any taxation at all. Such unnecessary 
overreporting would be counterproductive as too many reports without real grounds for 
suspicions would unnecessarily overload the workforce of the FIUs which may cause 
shortcomings in time and efficiency to be dedicated for investigation of serious crimes. 
However, such reports may give a clearer picture about the tax basis of some high-net-worth 
taxpayers to the tax authorities.  
If the second option is applied, not many transactions would be reported if all the other 
indicators imply legitimacy and transparency of the transaction disregarding that it may 
become illegal later at the end of the tax year. Consequently, the tax authorities would not get 
sufficient information to efficiently deal with tax evasion by use of cryptocurrency 
transactions. If currently the tax administrations do not receive full information of the 
taxpayers under their administration through any other legal framework (such as DAC or 
CRS), the AMLD is the only way to spot the tax crimes therefore this status should be 
utilized as efficiently as possible.  
 
Taking into account the above analysed insufficiencies of the AMLD in regard to 
cryptocurrency service providers and the limitation of the tax crimes covered by the AMLD 
due to the fact that the Directive is primarily aimed at money laundering and counter 
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terrorism financing instead of tax evasion, it must be concluded that the AMLD framework 
alone is insufficient to combat tax evasion practiced by the exploitation of cryptocurrencies.  
Apart of decentralized cryptocurrency service providers such as peer-to-peer trading 
platforms and non-custodian wallets, there are other parties and types of income that stay 
entirely outside the scope of any existing counter-tax evasion legislation in the EU. The 
examples of such payments are the income received from mining activity for verification of 
transactions and the income from the system updates (forks) which may be paid by the 
system automatically hence received unintentionally and impossible to reject. The reason 
such payments stay outside the EU tax evasion prevention legislation is that the legislation is 
directed towards intermediaries such as exchanges and wallet service providers, although not 
all of them can be covered due to enforcement difficulties. Nevertheless, the income from 
mining activity and system updates are generated by the cryptocurrency system itself. They 
are not being monitored or reported as they do not go through any exchange or from one 
wallet to another on peer-to-peer basis. Instead, they simply “appear” in the respective 
wallets. 
Another insufficiency of the EU counter tax evasion legislation is its geographical coverage. 
The AMLD regulates the cryptocurrency exchanges and custodian wallet service providers 
based in the EU, however, when consciously hiding assets from the tax authorities, the 
cryptocurrency users may use an exchange or a wallet in another jurisdiction out of the reach 
of the EU regulations. Moreover, operating in the Cyberspace, which is not linked to any 
particular jurisdiction, the use of decentralized service providers will be even more 
reasonable choice for the tax evaders and less accessible for the EU tax authorities. For this 
reason, the regulation of cryptocurrency service providers at regional level, although more 
appropriate than at national level, is still insufficient for achieving efficient results.
200
 
Based on the above analysis, it must be concluded that the tax evasion through 
cryptocurrencies is not sufficiently regulated in the EU to provide efficient results. 
 
3. Recommendations to improve the regulatory framework  
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The previous chapter established that the current regulation of cryptocurrencies in the EU 
does not efficiently deal with the tax evasion problem. The main cause of the lack of 
efficiency is incompatibility between cryptocurrencies and the existing forms of financial and 
tax regulations. Hence, innovative policymaking needs to be developed in response to the 
technological inventions where the traditional methods of regulation are dysfunctional.
201
  
Several academics, institutions and organizations have come forward with proposals for 
future regulation of cryptocurrencies, cryptocurrency service providers and other parties with 
the purpose to minimize opportunities of the use of cryptocurrencies for illegal reduction of 
tax liabilities and to discover the tax evasion activities already performed. The proposals are 
of different degrees of novelty, feasibility and enforceability. The most relevant of them will 
be analysed below, focusing on the European context. 
 
3.1.1. Bringing currently unregulated cryptocurrency service providers under the scope 
of the existing legislation. 
The most immediate and least creative proposal partly touched in the previous chapter is to 
include a wider range of cryptocurrency service providers in the regulation of the current 
legislative acts, namely AMLD and DAC.  
Since it is not clear from the text of DAC whether cryptocurrency service providers are 
included in the scope of the Directive or not, and it can be interpreted differently depending 
on the national legislation of the Member States, the European parliament in its Report on 
Financial Crimes of 2019 calls on the Commission to close these loopholes in the Directive.
 
202
 The way on how to close the loopholes is further analysed in the Report on EU automatic 
exchange of information by Andres Knobel. He recommends that all entities providing 
issuing, trading or exchange of cryptocurrencies be expressly defined among the included 
entities under the Directive.
203
 Such approach is viable as it avoids any misinterpretations and 
inconsistencies between the Member States and makes it possible to expressly apply the 
requirements of the Directive regarding automatic exchange of information on taxable 
income to the cryptocurrency service providers. Exact range of service providers to include in 
the scope of DAC should include, identically to the AMLD, the custodian wallet providers 
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and cryptocurrency exchanges as well as pure cryptocurrency exchanges as far as they are 
operated in a centralized manner. These entities ought to be in possession of or should be 
technically able to obtain the information required for the purposes of DAC and such 
information can be reached through them unlike decentralized services as analysed below.  
In regard to the AMLD, IMF in its Discussion Note of 2016
204
 just like European 
Commission in its Staff Working Document on amendments to AMLD
205
 of 2016 have both 
indicated that initially including the entities that provide exchange between cryptocurrencies 
and fiat currencies in the AML legislation should be sufficient.  
Both institutions as well as European Parliament in the Report on Financial Crimes of 
2019,
206
 have suggested extending the AMLD scope over cryptocurrency wallet providers 
and payment processors that operate exclusively with cryptocurrencies if the acceptance of 
cryptocurrencies increased in the society. Nevertheless, efficiency of such extension is highly 
dubious. While suggesting inclusion of entities operating entirely in cryptocurrency 
environment, IMF has admitted that in regard to decentralized virtual currency schemes the 
enforcement of the regulations is complicated due to the lack of specific entity in charge of 
transaction administration through which to carry out investigative activities as well as 
freezing and seizing of funds if necessary.
207
  
Another dubious matter in this regard is monitoring the compliance of the included entities 
with the regulations. Since there is no central counterparty to hold liable for compliance there 
is neither a way to supervise the subject entities nor to detect a breach of the regulations. The 
only method remains random encountering with the respective occasions of incompliance.
208
  
Consequently, simple bringing currently unregulated entities under the scope of AMLD 
would be inefficient. Hence, it is crucial to seek and develop other ways to regulate the 
decentralized entities.  
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3.1.2. Centralization of decentralized services   
To purportedly resolve the above exposed problem of the lack of a central administrator in 
decentralized virtual currency schemes in order to render any regulation thereof enforceable, 
some experts suggest artificial creation of a central party where such is absent. The corporate 
law scholars Robbie Houben and Alexander Snyers explain that creation and imposition of a 
“middleman” would allow to “attach the regulation to an identifiable person” which would 
enhance enforcement thus boosting compliance.
209
 However although they do not explicitly 
explain how exactly it could be done from technology and from legal points of view, their 
reference in this regard to the article describing different degrees of control of the 
administrators over permissioned blockchains,
210
 suggests that they mean the “middleman” as 
controller of the cryptocurrencies operating upon permissioned blockchain leaving the 
entirely decentralized systems uncovered. 
A team of financial law experts (Dirk Zetzsche, Ross Buckley and Douglas Arner) in their 
research on liability in distributed ledgers
211
 explain in more detail how such artificial 
introduction of a middleman could be implemented. They propose that the distributed ledgers 
can be structured as joint ventures where the operations are controlled by one single entity or 
a small amount of specified entities instead of a cooperation of a multitude of independent 
entities.
212
 Moreover, the formation of such structures does not necessarily need to be 
imposed by law. According to the three authors, common sense and economic need would 
drive the choice towards permissioned blockchains as financial services require organization 
and the investors require control rights in return for their investment.
213
 In that case the task 
of the regulator is to require that these entities be structured in such a way that they have 
access to sufficient information for the reporting under DAC within the EU and under CRS in 
the global scale. In this regard R.Houben and A.Snyers suggest bringing the cryptocurrency 
service providers under the scope of Funds Transfer Regulation (FTR)
214
 to ensure that all the 
                                                 
209
 Ibid, p.79. 
210
 P.Witzig and V.Salomon, supra note 114, p. 6-7. 
211
 D.A. Zetzsche et al “The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain (August 13, 
2017). University of Illinois Law Review, 2017-2018, Forthcoming; University of Luxembourg Law Working 
Paper No. 007/2017; Center for Business & Corporate Law (CBC) Working Paper 002/2017; University of 
Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2017/020; UNSW Law Research Paper No. 17-52; European 
Banking Institute Working Paper Series 14. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018214 
212
 Ibid, p.43. 
213
 Ibid, p.41. 
214
 Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information 
accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 1–18.  
52 
 
relevant information about the cryptocurrency transactions be collected.
215
 Article 4 of FTR 
lists the mandatory information to be collected on the payers and payees which includes the 
name, address, account number, personal document number and date and place of birth of the 
payee and the name and account number of the payment receiver missing any of the specified 
data the transactions are not executed.
216
  
Nevertheless, this proposition of introducing a controlling intermediary in the cryptocurrency 
schemes still covers only permissioned blockchains and does not resolve the problem of truly 
decentralized cryptocurrencies and their marketplaces. Taking into account that currently the 
decentralized virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Stellar, are the ones that have 
substantial dominance in the market, it is little likely that the permissioned blockchain 
schemes could take it over at any time soon, if at all.   
A noteworthy proposition was made by the European Banking Authority in its Opinion on 
Virtual Currencies of 2014. It suggests creating “scheme governance authorities”. A separate 
authority should be established for each virtual currency scheme. Such authority would be a 
non-governmental legal entity, accountable to the regulator for the following two aspects: 
1) technology aspect – it would be responsible for maintaining the integrity of the protocol, 
transactions ledger and other components of the scheme; 
2) legal aspect – it would establish and govern the rules for the use of the virtual currency 
scheme and would be responsible for complying with regulatory requirements of various 
kinds.
217
 
The governing bodies need not be created by the government, as EBA explains, the market 
participants could establish themselves as the governance authorities as long as they are able 
to exercise sufficient authority over other participants in the scheme to ensure the 
compliance.
218
 
As to the incompatibility with the decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies, EBA clarifies that 
such scheme governance body does not need to issue the virtual currency units in a 
centralized manner and the scheme can still operate through a protocol on a decentralized 
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ledger.
219
 As a motivation for the cryptocurrency schemes to create a governance authority 
EBA suggests that those virtual currencies that introduce a governing authority could 
officially be recognized financial services and be permitted to interact with the existing 
regulated financial services.
220
 Such recognition would be important providing these schemes 
higher level of credibility and regard in the eyes of customers.  
While EBA has intended by this proposition to cover also decentralized cryptocurrency 
schemes, it is difficult to envisage how this proposition could be implemented. Even if a 
market participant could attain sufficient authority in a particular virtual currency scheme to 
require the users, miners, nodes and any other party involved in the scheme to comply with 
certain legal requirements, for the purposes of this thesis, particularly the information 
collection and reporting requirements, the following two issues are hard to be solved.  
The first difficulty is the proposed idea of governing the technological aspects of the virtual 
currency scheme. The question is how an entity could technically ensure “maintaining the 
integrity of the central transaction ledger, the protocol, and any other core functional 
component of the scheme”221 in cases where the protocol is created anonymously and already 
completed, and there is no access point to do any changes if anything goes wrong with its 
“integrity”. As this is a question of technological nature, it will not be further analysed here. 
The other difficulty, however, concerns directly the compliance – how could the entity ensure 
the compliance if the nodes can be created simply through a software and likewise the users 
can access and use the cryptocurrencies simply through a software. On a permissionless 
blockchain no entity can prevent or control these processes which leaves only relying on its 
authority over the other participants of the particular virtual currency scheme and expecting 
that this authority be sufficient to convince the participants to cooperate. It could be argued 
that the involved parties would be interested to comply with the requirements in order to 
achieve the common interest of all – maintaining the status of the particular virtual currency 
scheme as a formal regulated financial service. Nevertheless, in practice it might work for 
cryptocurrencies with smaller market share, but it is difficult to imagine such controlling 
authority governing currently the most used cryptocurrency schemes such as Bitcoin, 
Litecoin or Monero.  
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3.1.3. Self-registration of users 
In the Section (9) of the recitals of the latest amendments of 2018 of the AMLD the European 
Parliament and the Council, as well as the European Commission in its proposal for the 
amendments,
222
 have admitted that the respective amendments are insufficient to resolve the 
issue of anonymity pertaining to cryptocurrency transactions as transactions can be done 
without participation of the regulated entities. Regulation of other service providers under 
AMLD is problematic due to enforcement difficulties. Hence, the EU has proposed additional 
means to reduce anonymity. Firstly, it requires that the national FIUs should be able to obtain 
the information that would allow linking addresses of virtual currencies with the identities of 
their owners.
223
 The second, it advises to further assess the possibility for the cryptocurrency 
users to self-declare to the national FIUs.
224
  
When working on the AMLD amendments, the Commission assessed two possibilities – 
mandatory and voluntary self-identification providing the identity and the virtual currency 
wallet information to the authorities. The Commission recognized that the mandatory self-
declaration would be more efficient in lifting the anonymity as all the users ought to be 
known. However, the two major drawbacks to this option are enforcement difficulties and 
disproportionality. As cryptocurrency transactions can be effectuated through software which 
does not verify registration of the users, it is not possible to ensure that all the users are 
actually registered.
225
 Additionally, the mandatory registration requirement would lack 
proportionality
226
 which is imperative according to the Article 5 of the Treaty on European 
Union.
227
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While voluntary self-declaration does not eradicate the anonymity, and especially the persons 
using cryptocurrencies for illicit purposes will typically not self-identify,
228
 a partial 
registration of users will facilitate the identification of the non-registered users. The reason is 
that the users in most cryptocurrency networks are interconnected by the transactions they 
perform. The unknown cryptocurrency addresses can be traced by their connections to the 
known addresses using the public ledger, hence the more addresses are known the less 
anonymous the whole system is.
229
 The American tax expert and academic Omri Marian calls 
it “cascade effect”.230 He also states that a certain “critical mass” of users would need to give 
up their anonymity for the entire system to become sufficiently non-anonymous to deter illicit 
activities including tax evasion.
231
  
Depending on the number of the registered users, the solution of volunteer self-registration 
proposed by the EU Commission could at some time become sufficiently efficient at the same 
time preserving proportionality since the right to privacy would be not be completely 
withheld.
232
  
Nevertheless, with respect to unveiling the anonymity of cryptocurrency users in general 
(meaning also outside of the context of virtual currency exchanges and custodian wallet 
providers), no immediate measures have been introduced.  
Although the recommendation of the Commission to further assess the self-declaration of 
cryptocurrency users on voluntary basis was included in the final text of the AMLD 
amendments, the Parliament in the Report on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance 
of the following year after the respective AMLD amendments (2019) called on the 
Commission to assess mandatory self-declaration of the users.
233
 Also the experts R.Houben 
and A.Snyers express that self-registration on voluntary basis is not a serious approach to 
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unveiling anonymity in cryptocurrency environment.
234
 The specialists suggest that for 
proportionality reasons the mandatory registration could be subject to materiality threshold. 
The enforcement however stays challenging.  
Nonetheless, no action so far has been taken towards introduction of self-declaration neither 
on voluntary nor mandatory basis. The options are still being assessed as stated in the Recital 
(8) of the amendments of 2018 to the AMLD.  
 
3.1.4. Taxing anonymity 
While the EU institutions debate over whether the registration of cryptocurrency users to be 
introduced should be on voluntary or mandatory basis in order to partly or fully lift the 
anonymity inherent to the use of cryptocurrencies, the American tax expert and academic 
Omri Marian offers a notable idea of taxing the anonymity. A concept of subjecting 
anonymity to an additional tax is recommended also by the EU tax expert Piergiorgio 
Valente
235
, however without providing more details on how to structure such system.  
Since cryptocurrency transactions can easily be done without going through financial 
intermediaries such as regulated exchanges, it is difficult to monitor tax compliance of such 
transactions. They may stay unreported and the income unknown to the tax authorities due to 
the lack of a reporting intermediary in possession of the transaction information. On the other 
hand, the regulation of individual users of cryptocurrencies would be excessive and would 
face enforcement difficulties as seen above when analysing imposition of mandatory 
registration of users. For this reason, in his proposal O.Marian offers to target another 
category which often participates in cryptocurrency transactions – the merchants that receive 
cryptocurrencies in payment for goods or services. Alternatively, the regulation could target 
the clearing service providers used by the merchants in cryptocurrency transactions. 
236
 
The main reasons for the acquisition of cryptocurrencies is to use them as a medium of 
exchange in trade for goods or services as well as for private remittances and for investment 
purposes.
237
 Hence, the merchants who accept payments in virtual currencies form a broad 
category present in cryptocurrency transactions. O.Marian suggests that, just like the foreign 
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banks unwilling to comply with the reporting requirements of the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) of the USA become tax withholding agents on behalf of IRS,
238
 the merchants could 
become tax agents for cryptocurrency payments. According to the Section 1471 of the US 
Internal Revenue Code for tax evasion restriction purposes, unless the foreign financial 
institution enters into agreement with the US Secretary of the Treasury acquiescing to report 
the financial information of its US clients including account balances and withdrawals 
thereof, the financial institutions must withhold 30 % of the withholdable payments (typically 
regular income, dividends, interest payments, proceeds of sale of property among others).
239
 
The financial service providers are allowed to maintain the anonymity of their clients if the 
30% tax on such payments is withheld by the institutions and remitted to IRS. O.Marian 
suggests that in a similar way the merchants receiving payments in cryptocurrencies could 
apply a “special cryptocurrency-transaction tax”240 on such payments unless the payer 
discloses his/her identity. O.Marian describes such model as “surrogate presumptive 
collection” where the merchant would act as a surrogate in collecting the presumed tax 
liability of the purchaser.
241
 It is assumed that once the users voluntarily disclose their 
identity upon performing a transaction, they would be more inclined to report their 
cryptocurrency transactions afterwards and comply with the taxation requirements. At the 
same time, if the anonymity is upheld, the tax would serve as a proxy for the presumed tax 
incompliance. To incentivize the customers to revel their anonymity, the tax collected on 
anonymous payments should be higher than the tax the users would subject to when declaring 
their income directly to the tax authority.
242
 This way the taxpayers would have to choose 
between preserving their anonymity and paying higher tax or revealing their identity and 
paying a lower tax. 
While the EU proposes introduction of a “clearly defined, close to costless and voluntary 
channel to self-identify”243 without providing any motivational argument for the 
cryptocurrency users to do so, the chance of overpaying for the opportunity to stay 
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anonymous offered by O.Marian could be much more efficient. Such scheme would also 
ensure real income to the governments in form of tax for anonymous transactions while 
simple self-declaration would only facilitate the work of tax authorities on tracking down the 
tax evasion cases which would, contrary to tax collection, consume the funds of investigation 
institutions before starting to bring any return. 
 
3.1.5. Prohibition of specific aspects of cryptocurrencies  
Cryptocurrencies are believed to pose high risk of being used for criminal activities. This has 
not only been observed by international organizations, for instance, EBA
244
 and FATF,
245
 but 
also confirmed in practice, for example, when the American authorities shut down the dark 
web marketplace “Silk Road”246 where the transactions over illegal goods such as drugs, 
arms, stolen identities etc. were performed in cryptocurrencies. The authorities and 
organizations have indicated many other risks that the use of cryptocurrencies may generate 
such as use of cryptocurrencies for money laundering and terrorism financing, hacking of 
wallets, irreversibility of erroneous or fraudulent transactions and, of course, tax evasion, are 
few of them. For the reason of presenting large number of risks, including risks of high 
importance, and the current inability and lack of knowledge of efficient regulation and 
enforcement thereof, several countries have introduced an explicit ban on all the activities 
involving cryptocurrencies, including mining, trading and using them in any way. Some 
examples of such countries are Bolivia,
247
 Algeria,
248
 Pakistan.
249
  
Scholars and organizations from economically developed countries, however, consider such 
strict and complete prohibition of cryptocurrencies an excessive and disproportionate 
measure that would unnecessarily slow down innovation and technological development. 
Absolute cryptocurrency prohibition is expressly criticized by S.Gruber
250
, R.Houben and 
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A.Snyers
251
 as well as IMF
252
 and EU Commission
253
. For instance, IMF has described such 
prohibition “unduly blunt” recommending instead more targeted approach and commensurate 
regulation of the risks presented by cryptocurrencies.
254
  
Other countries have adopted slightly less restrictive measures and have prohibited the 
interaction of cryptocurrencies with the “real world economy” by prohibiting the financial 
services institutions to deal in any way with cryptocurrencies at the same time leaving the 
transactions purely in cryptocurrency environment permitted. Such an example is China 
whose Central Bank has prohibited the financial and payment institutions to trade or in any 
way use virtual currencies.
255
  
Also EBA its Opinion on Virtual Currencies of 2014 has recommended “shielding” virtual 
currency schemes from the regulated financial services by discouraging credit institutions, 
payment institutions, and e-money institutions from involving in any type of activity with 
virtual currencies including buying, selling or holding them.
256
 EBA explained that such 
isolation of virtual currencies from the regulated financial services would mitigate the risks 
that arise from the interconnection between the two “economies”, including the risk of money 
laundering and financial crime, but should be used only as an immediate regulatory response 
for short term until a comprehensive regulatory regime be developed explicitly indicating that 
there is a chance that such regime may not get developed at all.
257
 Nevertheless, R.Houben 
and A.Snyers indicate that general exhaustive bans are not favoured neither on 
cryptocurrencies nor on their interaction with the formal financial sector.
258
  
Likewise, by choosing to assess the self-declaration of the cryptocurrency users on voluntary 
basis instead of mandatory basis, according to the text of the AMLD, the EU Commission has 
made it clear that cryptocurrency economy is being respected and should bear as few 
restrictions as essentially necessary for preventing the risks associated with cryptocurrencies. 
One of the reasons for the decision to choose voluntary self-declaration over mandatory is 
that although by voluntary self-declaration not all the cryptocurrency owners would be 
revealed, such self-declaration of a certain part of the users might be sufficiently helpful for 
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the authorities to discover the unknown users. However, the situation is entirely different 
when the enhanced anonymization tools are concerned. Such additional tools for privacy 
protection are provided by Monero, Dash, Zcash and other cryptocurrencies, the so-called 
privacy coins. These tools make the cryptocurrency transactions untraceable and neither 
voluntary nor mandatory self-declaration of the users does not facilitate the detection of the 
unregistered users.  
R.Houben and A.Snyers argue that such level of anonymity is not truly necessary and leads 
too far towards criminal activity.
259
 While declaring against general bans, they recommend 
well-defined and properly targeted prohibitions of specific aspects of cryptocurrencies. One 
of such aspects to be expressly prohibited is the additional anonymity enhancing tools aimed 
at making the detection and verification of the cryptocurrency users impossible as it 
particularly facilitates the use of cryptocurrencies for illicit purposes.
260
 The opinion of 
R.Houben and A.Snyers is supported by the EU Parliament in its Tax evasion report calling 
on the Commission to assess prohibition of the additional anonymity measures specific to 
particular cryptocurrencies.
261
  
On the other hand, the American legal specialist Gruber (2013) analysing the use of 
cryptocurrencies for money laundering and tax evasion purposes, is more cautious when 
mentioning prohibition of anonymity services of specific cryptocurrencies. She suggests that 
the future regulation targeting these measures might include prohibition, however, she is 
concerned that such prohibition would thus imply the lack of any legitimate reason for 
camouflaging one’s source of funds, IP address or identity262 while it is not entirely true. 
Identically to offshore companies and bank accounts, also additional anonymity services on 
cryptocurrencies may be used for a variety of reasons. Whereas the most common reason, at 
least in regard to hiding money in offshore tax havens, indeed is tax evasion, many other 
reasons for doing so exist although less frequent. They may include asset protection from 
potential creditors, ex-spouses, business partners, competitors, from seizure during 
unfounded lawsuits, or from extortionists or criminals whatsoever.
263
 Many of these reasons 
may be fully legal. Moreover, when tracing cryptocurrencies the state institutions use only 
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knowledge and technical abilities either developed on their own or contracted from outside. 
There are no state orders issued to request confidential information or to access to any 
systems. Hence, since there is no need for state power at all to trace cryptocurrencies, anyone 
with sufficient knowledge can do it. For this reason, hiding assets behind additional shield of 
anonymity in the cryptocurrency environment may frequently have fully legitimate grounds.  
A response to this contention against prohibition of enhanced anonymity tools, might be the 
argument of R.Houben and A.Snyers that the interest of the society and the authorities 
defending it outweighs the interest of the persons willing to conceal completely their 
identities when performing cryptocurrency transactions, and clearly formulated and precisely 
targeted prohibitions of high-risk dangerous characteristics of cryptocurrencies may be a 
proper way of doing it.
264
 The same argument is used in defence of the legislation that 
requires the banks and financial institutions to disclose the financial information about their 
clients to the tax and crime investigation authorities.
265
 The difference, however, is that in the 
case of financial institutions the information is confidential and is not accessible to any third 
parties therefore no additional anonymity services are needed to protect the information for 
legitimate purposes from competitors, criminals or any other unwanted persons while 
cryptocurrency transactions can be traced by anyone hence additional layer of anonymity 
may be justifiable. The argument that the financial information in cryptocurrency area may be 
accessed by anyone, may be the reason to admit that the prohibition of the enhanced 
anonymity services on cryptocurrency transactions does not meet the requirement of 
proportionality. 
In addition to anonymity services of specific cryptocurrencies, S.Gruber invites to include the 
Tor Internet browser between the aspects of cryptocurrencies whose prohibition should be 
assessed. Tor browser provides anonymous browsing on internet without leaving any trail or 
history of the visited websites as well as obfuscating the physical location and IP address of 
the user. The motive why S.Gruber advises to include this service among the services 
possibly deserving prohibition is that the use of this browser was a mandatory pre-condition 
to participate in the illegal online marketplace Silk Road.
266
 Nevertheless, such proposition is 
exaggerated as privacy browsing on internet has particularly wide use apart of criminal 
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activities, especially in the current age of surveillance capitalism imposed by Google, 
Facebook and other ubiquitous Internet giants.
267
  
An additional comment regarding the possible prohibition of anonymity technologies is the 
enforceability issue that accompanies many aspects of the cryptocurrencies. Even if the use of 
anonymity services was expressly forbidden and criminal sanctions for using or providing 
such services were provided by law, currently there is no technology to detect a breach of 
such occurrence except for random encountering by chance.
268
  
 
3.1.6. Tax incentives 
One of the concerns of the government authorities when intending to regulate cryptocurrency 
market participants is finding a proper balance between insufficient regulation and 
overregulation. The consequences of insufficient regulation would be the risks associated 
with the use of virtual currencies as listed by EBA in its Opinion on Virtual Currencies of 
2016 including the possibility of the use of cryptocurrencies for criminal purposes, for hiding 
assets and evading taxes. Overregulation, on the other hand, would increase the costs of 
cryptocurrency transaction services due to increased compliance costs, reduce the number of 
users driving them away from cryptocurrencies towards fintech or conventional banking 
services, and as a result it would reduce the investment in this market slowing down the 
innovation and technological development related thereto.  
In order to deal with such situation, the American scholar Benjamin Molloy in his study on 
international tax policy concerning cryptocurrencies recommends providing tax incentives for 
cryptocurrency operations.
269
 He indicates that such incentives would motivate the users to 
continue investing in cryptocurrencies market.
270
 The tax benefits could also be seen as 
compensating for the increased compliance costs which have affected the cryptocurrency 
users of a form of increased service fees.  
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B.Molloy claims that the preferential tax treatment on cryptocurrency transactions would 
have an additional benefit. It would incentivize users to report their transactions.
271
 This 
however would consequently contribute to making the whole cryptocurrency market less 
anonymous as more cryptocurrency users being identified makes it easier to identify the 
unknown users. 
 
4. Attempts of specific EU Countries to restrain the use of cryptocurrencies 
for tax evasion 
 
As established previously in this thesis, the currently existing counter tax evasion legislation 
in force in the EU is not sufficient to efficiently prevent tax evasion through the use of 
cryptocurrencies and in some cases cannot even be extended to cryptocurrency transactions at 
all. Nevertheless, while the regulation is still slowly developing, the national tax agencies 
worldwide and in the EU are making efforts individually to curb the tax evasion performed 
through cryptocurrencies.  
Currently two approaches have been occasionally used by the tax authorities. The first 
approach is requesting information about cryptocurrency users and their performed 
transactions from the cryptocurrency service providers operating within the respective 
country. The other approach is requesting the information directly from the users additionally 
threatening them with possible sanctions for the incompliance with the request of information 
and with the tax regulations in force. Occasionally both these approached follow each other 
first obtaining the information from the service providers and then contacting the persons that 
have been reported during the first stage.  
The above double approach has been used by the Danish tax authority. During 2019 the 
Danish tax agency had requested information from three major cryptocurrency exchanges in 
Denmark obtaining data about approximately 20,000 cryptocurrency traders.
272
 Later in the 
same year the tax authority sent letters to an unknown number of the identified 
cryptocurrency users requesting information for the purpose of taxation. The information to 
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be provided includes the rates and time of the trades, purpose of the transactions, proof of 
wallets created, bank statements and a statement of current holdings in cryptocurrencies.
273
  
The Spanish Ministry of the Treasury in April of 2018 requested information from more than 
60 entities which provide services involving cryptocurrencies. The entities included banks, 
exchanges operating with virtual currencies, entities operating cryptocurrency ATMs, and 
payment processors.
274
 As a result of the collected information the tax agency has selected 
15,000 persons who had performed transactions in cryptocurrencies during the previous year 
on whom a close monitoring would be carried out for the purpose of tax compliance and 
prevention of money laundering.
275
 The Spanish government, however, is not optimistic 
about the tax collection expecting just a little income in the state treasury from the 
cryptocurrency users while focusing more on detecting and curtailing illicit cash flows and 
money laundering.
276
  
In August of 2019 the UK state revenue service contacted at least three UK based 
cryptocurrency exchanges including one of the major global exchanges Coinbase to request 
information about the users and their performed transactions.
277
 
Nevertheless, there are several factors that limit the efficiency of the above described 
activities.  
Firstly, the reach of the national tax authorities is limited to requesting information only from 
the entities that are registered or operate in the territory of their own country. Considering the 
global and border-less operation of cryptocurrencies, the tax agencies can obtain only a tiny 
part of the actual information about the activities of its taxpayers in the environment of 
cryptocurrencies. Moreover, the data on users and transactions performed through 
decentralized services such as peer-to-peer trading platforms, offline and hardware wallets 
cannot be obtained at all unless a sophisticated investigation is carried out. When performing 
taxable transactions or acquiring cryptocurrencies for investment purposes with prior intent to 
skip the reporting and tax requirements, the persons are more likely to use foreign or 
decentralized services. Hence, only the unexperienced or inadvertent users could be caught 
this way. The cryptocurrency exchange Coinbase described such actions as “fishing 
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expedition” when it was for the first time approached by a similar request of customer data by 
the Tax authority of the USA.
278
  
Certain difficulties exist for the affected entities to provide clear and accurate information to 
the tax authorities. In regard to the time period covered by the requests of information, they 
usually do not exceed 2 – 3 years. For instance, Danish tax authority in 2019 requested 
information about the transactions performed between 2016 and 2018.
279
 As the investigation 
of the Spanish government is more intended for stopping the use of cryptocurrencies for 
criminal activities than to detect tax liabilities, the requests concern the situation and holdings 
at the moment of the request rather than transactions performed and income gained in the 
previous years.
280
 Providing information for a longer period would be rather difficult for the 
service providers, however, when analysing the data only of the last few years, the 
individuals who entered the cryptocurrency environment early and made the most significant 
gains would not be affected.
281
 The calculation of exact gains of each person is also as many 
users have many exchange accounts and wallets between which different amounts in different 
cryptocurrencies are often transferred.
282
 Another difficulty for the cryptocurrency users is to 
calculate exact gains from the cryptocurrency assets upon their disposal as many users make 
multiple transactions per day or use cryptocurrencies for daily consumption and purchases of 
small amounts, for example, for food items or retail goods.
283
 Such problem is not 
encountered in the regular investment environment as people do not commonly pay for the 
goods or products in a store by stock, bonds or commodities.   
Another noteworthy effort in curbing tax evasion through cryptocurrencies must be 
mentioned the international cooperation that has been developed between the tax authorities 
of five globally significant economies – the UK, Netherlands, USA, Canada and Australia. 
The block of cooperation of the tax agencies of these countries is called Joint Chiefs of 
Global Tax Enforcement or J5. Initially formed for the investigation of participation in 
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international tax evasion crimes by a financial institution from the Central America,
284
 after 
the first successful teamwork, J5 have decided to continue working together. One of their 
common objectives is to track down the individuals engaged tax crimes through 
cryptocurrencies. The tax authorities of the five countries have brought together investigators, 
data scientists and cryptocurrency experts to join the leads, trends and methodologies in order 
to find cyber tax offenders.
285
 As a result of the cooperation, several significant connections 
were made between the data points made available by the experts of each country which 
could not have been made when working individually.
286
 
Although it is little likely that the tax authorities with the currently available technological 
means could obtain extensive information on cryptocurrency transactions and assets held by 
the users beyond the information reported due to the reasons mentioned above, the current 
efforts of the tax authorities are just the beginning. New tools and methods to obtain the 
access to the currently unavailable data are being continuously sought and developed. More 
serious actions are expected to be taken against the incompliant individuals whenever 
discovered.
287
 For this reason, the users and investors of cryptocurrencies would be well 
advised to get their affairs with the tax authorities in order and, if necessary, rectify their 
previous tax declarations as early as possible.
288
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Tax evasion is a serious problem which negatively affects national economies, society and in 
an indirect manner all the residents of each state. The main previously available tax evasion 
tools such as corporate structures and bank accounts in tax neutral jurisdictions, due to high 
costs and legal complexity were the privilege of wealthy people and were recently efficiently 
restricted by global counter tax evasion regulations. The novel technology of 
cryptocurrencies, however, provides properties that make the tax evasion efficient, profitable 
and available to the individuals and corporations of any income level. Pseudo anonymity and 
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reduced traceability of cryptocurrency transactions decrease the risk of detectability of the tax 
evasion while the low cost of cryptocurrency transactions grant high return thereof. 
As a non-precedent disruptive technology, cryptocurrencies face multiple regulatory issues. 
The most relevant challenges are the choice of regulator, choice of any of the existing legal 
frameworks, geographic extension of the regulation and the selection of the subjects of the 
regulation. 
Cryptocurrencies operate in the Cyberspace which is not connected to any particular 
jurisdiction but instead includes all the jurisdictions worldwide. The lack of unified taxation 
regulations in order to respect the tax sovereignty causes inconsistencies in the application of 
tax laws on cryptocurrencies. As a result of such fragmentation, taxable cryptocurrency 
transactions may become a ‘stateless income’ where tax liability cannot be legally imposed. 
Also the tax evasion prevention regulation over cryptocurrencies may only be efficient when 
implemented on a global scale, not national or regional.   
The tax evasion prevention legislation at global as well as at EU level is based on information 
sharing between the tax authorities and the financial institutions that hold funds and perform 
transactions for the customers. Cryptocurrencies operate through a decentralized software 
which is maintained in a decentralized way through nodes that may be dispersed worldwide. 
Since there is no central intermediary administrator in the system, there is no one who can 
perform the identification of the customers and report the data. Lack of the central 
administrator also impedes the process of the enforcement of the regulations.  
The current EU tax evasion prevention regulation is insufficient to efficiently deal with the 
tax evasion through the use of cryptocurrencies. The Directive on administrative cooperation 
in the field of taxation does not expressly include cryptocurrency service providers hence it 
depends on the interpretation of the Member States whether according to their national 
legislation the definition of ‘financial assets’ includes cryptocurrencies and whether the 
definition of ‘custodial institutions’ covers cryptocurrency exchanges and custodian wallet 
providers or not. The Anti Money Laundering Directive, on the other hand, does explicitly 
include entities providing exchange between cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies, and the 
providers of custodian wallets as obliged to obtain the Due Diligence information on the 
customers and report suspicious transactions. Nevertheless, the Directive does not cover all 
the tax evasion cases. It only covers tax evasion of a serious level subject to high threshold of 
criminal liability in the Member states. Given that cryptocurrencies provide for a simple, 
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efficient and economical way to hide taxable assets, it is more likely to expect tax evasion of 
small amounts hence only a small part of the tax evasion cases may be suspected, reported or 
discovered based on this directive.  
Several parties involved in cryptocurrency dealings stay entirely outside the EU tax evasion 
prevention legislation. Due to enforcement difficulties no regulation covers decentralized 
cryptocurrency exchanges, peer to peer trading platforms and wallets that are not custodian. 
Although control and enforcement of regulations is possible over centralized pure 
cryptocurrency exchanges and at some degree service providers of permissioned 
cryptocurrencies, such entities are not regulated either. Nevertheless, such entities are the 
most likely to be used when consciously intending to hide assets from the tax authorities.  
There is also no regulation aimed at minimization of tax evasion on the income generated by 
the cryptocurrency system itself such as income from mining and income from system 
updates (forks) as currently there are no means to detect such income unless the receiver 
reports it.  
The recommendations for the future regulation made by authorities, international 
organizations and academics each provides only partial solution of some of the problems 
caused by the novelty of the cryptocurrencies and their underlying distributed ledger 
technology.  
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